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ARTICLES
CHOOSING A COURT TO REVIEW
THE EXECUTIVE
JOSEPH W. MEAD ∗ & NICHOLAS A. FROMHERZ **
For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency
action by single-judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by
circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling
on a uniform scheme—or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle—
Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and
within statutes and agencies.
In this Article, we offer a fresh look at the theoretical and empirical factors that ought
to inform the allocation of the judicial power between district and circuit courts in suits
challenging agency action. We conclude that the current scheme is both incoherent and, to
the extent it favors direct review by circuit courts, unjustified. We conclude that initial
review by district courts is, in general, the better option, and a clear divide is preferable to
the ad hoc approach that Congress has favored. Along the way, we offer a new analytical
framework for deciding which court should review the Executive.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial review of executive action occupies a unique place in federal
jurisprudence.
But which court undertakes that review?
The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes a near-universal standard of
review of agency decisions, but it says nothing about the proper forum.
Instead, litigants must look elsewhere for jurisdiction, and the United States
Code is replete with thousands of compromises dividing initial review of
agency decisions between district and circuit courts.1
This complex scheme of dividing original jurisdiction between appellate
and trial courts has no parallel in any other aspect of modern federal
jurisdiction. And while this scheme of split review is familiar to
practitioners of administrative law, time has hardly served to iron out the
wrinkles. Determining the proper court to review administrative decisions
has been the subject of debate since Marbury v. Madison 2 and requires

1. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 309 (1985) (“A
recurrent issue of federal jurisdiction is whether judicial review of an administrative agency’s
decision may be sought in a federal district court in the first instance or must be sought
directly in a federal court of appeals.”).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 148 (1803).
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frequent Supreme Court intervention to unravel. 3
Today’s allocation of jurisdiction to review agency decisions is
untenable. 4 Complexity has its costs—for litigants, for agencies, and for the
courts themselves. To determine which court has jurisdiction, one is left to
sift through more than one thousand statutory provisions sprawled across
fifty-one titles of the United States Code, enacted piecemeal through more
than one hundred years of legislation. 5 On top of these statutory provisions
are decades of judicial interpretations, often pointing in inconsistent
directions and further clouding the question of jurisdiction. The ambiguity
of this divided system leads not only to deadweight loss in terms of litigating
jurisdiction, but it can lead to forfeited claims if a litigant misses a deadline
by filing in the wrong court.
The costs of complexity might be warranted if there were strong reasons
for favoring one type of review over another in a given situation. Yet one
searches in vain for evidence of intelligent design in the current system.
Few patterns emerge from the seemingly random distribution of initial
agency review between circuit and district courts, and Congress generally,
though not always, 6 declines to explain its choice of forum. 7 Even a casual
survey can find countless examples of similar actions by different agencies
being challenged in different courts. For example, decertified airline
mechanics proceed directly to circuit court, 8 while decertified Navy

3. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2130 (2012); Sackett v. EPA,
132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2012); Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 600 (2012); Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147–48 (2010).
4. Over seventy years ago, scholars issued a similar indictment of a far simpler (but
still divided) system of judicial review of agency decisions, yet things have only gotten worse.
James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law: The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 HARV. L. REV.
1077, 1090 (1940) (“It is clear that no one can defend today our variegated scheme for
judicial review of administrative action . . . .”); Orrin B. Evans, Historical Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts to Review Federal Administrative Action, 31 IOWA L. REV. 369, 371 (1946) (“There
was, of course, no sense in the dual system of nisi prius courts . . . .”); cf. ROSCOE POUND,
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 107, 195 (1940) (describing as “anomalous” the nineteenth
century system of two courts of general trial jurisdiction).
5. Evans, supra note 4, at 376 (“A lawyer seeking light on the question of judicial
review of administrative orders cannot turn to any statute or chapter containing a
comprehensive code on the subject . . . . He must search the statutes relating to the
substantive law of his case.”).
6. For example, Congress’s concern with dilatory appeals motivated its repeated
concentration of review of deportation orders in the courts of appeals. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S.
217, 224 (1963).
7. Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals,
88 HARV. L. REV. 980, 999 (1975) (noting the “frequent absence of any apparent legislative
purpose for particular jurisdictional limitations”); Evans, supra note 4, at 382 (“I have not
been able to find any measurable degree of consistency within any classification.”).
8. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2012).
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instructors or body armor manufacturers go to district court. 9 Horse
Protection Act regulations can be challenged in district court, but
adjudications go to the circuit court. 10 The rule is flipped for the
Department of Energy, where regulations under the Energy Policy Act can
be challenged in the circuit court, 11 while determinations of entitlement to
Energy Star designation are brought in district court. 12 And Congress
continues to enthusiastically churn out jurisdictional decisions for agency
review each year without any apparent framework, making the problem
worse and worse.
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that scholars and practitioners
have wrestled with the jurisdictional difficulties that exist for particular
statutory provisions or agency programs. 13 Determining the proper court
for initial review in any given context is obviously important, but the
limited nature of such an inquiry makes it difficult to address the real
problem: the absence of organizing principles and uniform criteria.
Our analysis proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we provide a brief
background on the historical and modern system of judicial review of
agency decisions. We also map out the jurisdictional tests that courts have
adopted to deal with the statutory mess and argue that these tests have
confused rather than clarified matters.
In Part II, we address the central question—which court, or courts,
should review agency decisions? We analyze the issue as it is usually
presented—a choice between initial review in the district court or direct
review in the circuit court. To conduct our analysis, we consider a number
of different factors, including efficiency, especially cost and time to final
decision, accuracy of judgment, legitimacy and appearance, litigant
9. See, e.g., Foster v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (D.D.C. 2012); Pinnacle Armor,
Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL 2994111, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), (e)(2).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(1).
12. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 679 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2010).
13. See generally Allison LaPlante & Lia Comerford, On Judicial Review Under the Clean
Water Act in the Wake of Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center: What We Now
Know and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43 ENVTL. L. 767 (2013); Shaina N. Elias, Essay,
Challenges to Inclusion on the “No-Fly List” Should Fly in District Court: Considering the Jurisdictional
Implications of Administrative Agency Structure, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1015 (2009); Paul R.
Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability
Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731 (2003); Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum
Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1297 (1986); Jonathan A. Schorr, Note, The Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action:
Interpreting Special Review Statutes, 63 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1983); David P. Currie & Frank I.
Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, supra note 7; Stephen B. Goldberg, District Court Review of
NLRB Representation Proceedings, 42 IND. L.J. 455 (1967).
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preferences, workload distribution, the benefit of precedent, and the cost of
jurisdictional uncertainty. Through this analysis, we find that the case for
direct review in circuit courts has little in the way of theoretical or empirical
heft. In the context of challenges to agency action, it would appear that
district courts are generally as capable—and usually more efficient—than
their counterparts at the circuit level.
In Part III, we build on our analysis to make the case for uniform rules.
The current scheme drives up the costs for litigants and the courts alike.
These costs are not justified by gains in accuracy or otherwise superior
decisionmaking. The upshot is two-fold: (1) going forward, Congress
should revisit the allocation of judicial power in cases challenging agency
action, not in a piecemeal fashion, as has been its tendency, but in a
comprehensive manner that applies uniform criteria; and (2) in conducting
this review, Congress should give serious weight to a scheme that favors
initial review by district courts. Yet, regardless of how the balance is
struck—in favor of initial review by district courts or by circuit courts—we
desperately need an allocative scheme that is clear and informed by
uniform criteria.
In sum, this Article offers a fresh take on the beguiling jurisdictional
landscape of judicial review of agency decisions. By deconstructing the
status quo and analyzing the issue anew, we identify several factors to guide
the inquiry of which court should review the Executive. Along the way, we
offer specific guidance to courts and litigants to help make sense of the
complicated status quo, and we pave the way for empirical study to address
the uncertainties surrounding judicial review by district courts and circuit
courts.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISIONMAKING
In this Part, we provide a brief background on the historical and modern
systems of judicial review. Today, judicial review of federal agency
decisions is largely governed by the APA. 14 Under the APA, courts review
agency decisions under a deferential set of standards that mimic, in many
regards, an appellate court’s review of the discretionary decisions of a trial
court. 15 This review is conducted based on the administrative record,16 a
record that is, at least in theory, frozen in time and unalterable before the
court. 17 Although both the standard and scope of review are nearly

14. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1995).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
17. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (stating the standard should come from the
administrative record already in existence).
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universal, 18 the court that undertakes this review varies sharply depending
on the nature of the agency action and the legal theories of the challenge. 19
Thus, in a departure from the usual model of federal litigation, challenges
to hundreds of agency decisions can only be brought directly in the circuit
court, bypassing the district court altogether. Whether a case begins in the
district or circuit court is up to Congress, and Congress’s choice of forum
varies seemingly at random from statute to statute, reflecting uncertainty
about the ideal forum for challenges to administrative action. 20
A. Background on Judicial Review
Historically, the opportunities to obtain judicial review of Executive
Branch action were extremely limited. 21 Individuals claiming injury could
bring writs of mandamus, 22 habeas corpus, 23 and other prerogative writs
whose familiarity has been lost to time. 24 These writs were extremely
limited in scope—mandamus being limited to “ministerial” duties, 25 and
habeas corpus requiring the petitioner to be in custody—and provided
severely limited opportunities for judicial oversight of the Executive.
Alternatively, a citizen might pursue a tort claim—say, defamation or
trespass—against an aggrieving officer, but the suit would be limited by the
vagaries of state law and falter against the bar of sovereign immunity if the
officer acted within the scope of his official duties. 26 Today, an individual
might also pursue a constitutional tort claim against an officer but must still
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. As Aaron-Andrew Bruhl points out, however, it is possible that
doctrinal homogeneity masks variation in practice. While invoking the same standard of
deference (e.g., Chevron), it may well be the case that the Supreme Court, and even the circuit
courts, actually afford far less deference to agency calls than district courts. See generally
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 727 (2013).
19. See infra Part I.B.2.
20. Though there may be some limits on Congress’s power to define the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts, split allocation is clearly constitutional. See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816
F.2d 695, 704–07 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1319–20 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Richard E. Flint, The Evolving Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief in the Texas
Supreme Court: One More “Mile Marker Down the Road of No Return”, 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 10–47
(2007) (discussing the development of the writ of mandamus).
23. Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 762–63
(2013).
24. See generally Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523
(1923) (providing a historical background on various types of writs found in the English legal
system).
25. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 580 (1838).
26. Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of
the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 533 (2013).
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overcome various immunities. 27
As the twentieth century arrived and the administrative state grew, so
too did elaborate statutory schemes providing for judicial oversight of
agency decisionmaking. 28 In order to prescribe a uniform set of standards,
Congress passed the APA in 1946, which dictates the standard of review
that applies to the vast majority of challenges to agency action. 29
Significantly, as discussed below, the APA does not specify which court will
hear the challenge.
Under the APA’s approach, challenges to administrative decisions are
treated largely like appeals from the agency’s decision. 30 Like an appeal,
the reviewing court considers the agency’s decision on the factual record
developed by the agency. 31 Agency factual findings control the reviewing
court, be it district or circuit, so long as they are supported by “substantial
evidence.” 32 Agency judgment calls are not reviewed for their correctness
or wisdom, but only for whether they are arbitrary or capricious.33
Although the APA does not explicitly prescribe a deferential standard for
reviewing an agency’s legal interpretations, 34 the Chevron, 35 Skidmore, 36 and
Seminole Rock 37 doctrines require significant judicial deference to an agency’s
view of law. If the court concludes that the agency’s judgment was in error,
the proper remedy is a remand to reassess, not for the court to decide the

27. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 208
(2013).
28. Note, Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 901
(1957).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
30. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787,
828 (2012). Before 1900, judicial review was generally through de novo common law
actions and did not follow the appellate model. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Article III,
Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 939 (2011).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (noting that “the focal
point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some
new record made initially in the reviewing court”).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
33. Id. § 706(2)(A).
34. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–42 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite. But it was in accord with the
origins of federal-court judicial review.”).
35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(requiring deference to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutes).
36. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (requiring a different degree of
deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes).
37. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (requiring deference to
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations).
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issue de novo. 38 The APA’s standards apply to all judicial review of agency
decisions unless another statute expressly prescribes a different standard. 39
Although the appellate model applies in many respects to challenges of
agency action, they are, both formally and functionally, not appeals. As a
formal matter, they are new actions, a tenet which reflects the boundary
between the Executive and Judicial Branches. Further, the fact that one
branch is reviewing the work of another immediately implicates numerous
separation of powers concerns. Thus, unlike an appellate court, whose
review of lower court action is simply a question of allocation of the judicial
power, the proper review of agency action reflects due concern for the
allocation of power between the branches. As the Supreme Court said in
1894, when decreeing a particularly deferential standard of review for
agency action: “But this is something more than a mere appeal. It is an
application to the court to set aside the action of one of the executive
departments of the government.”40
Judicial review of agency action is not without its controversy, at least in
non-constitutional cases. 41 A generalist judge reversing the decision of an
expert agency strikes some as rather like the pupil correcting the teacher. 42
Still, proponents of judicial review might argue that court ratification is
needed to fulfill the sentiment behind Marbury’s famous dictum: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.” 43 Indeed, courts are often thought to be superior to agencies in

38. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 657–
58 (2007) (noting that the circuit court erred because “it jumped ahead to resolve the merits
of the dispute” rather than remanding to the agency).
39. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988).
40. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894).
41. Robert Shaffer, Judicial Oversight in the Comparative Context: Biodiversity Protection in the
United States, Australia, and Canada, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,169, 10,170
(2013) (“In practice, though, arbitrariness review has proven hugely controversial,
generating an array of scholarship examining its impact on the broader policymaking
process.”); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1243, 1251–52 (1999).
42. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review
as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011) (discussing “[t]he premise
that expert agencies are better situated than generalist judges to make policy decisions in
light of scientific uncertainty”); Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass’n v. FDA, 766 F.2d 592, 599–600
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Though CLMA [Contact Lens Manufacturers Association] presses this
argument with vigor, we are mindful that in such matters generalist courts see through a
glass darkly and should be especially reluctant to upset an expert agency’s judgment that a
party has failed to adduce sufficient scientific proof of safety and effectiveness.”).
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Cross, supra note 41, at
1247–48, 1266–68 (criticizing this rationale, noting that it “is almost tautological”). The
strength of this rationale loses much of its force in light of doctrines such as Chevron. Id. at
1278.
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ensuring that the rights of individuals are left untrammeled. 44 Further,
federal judges are less susceptible than administrators to “capture” by a
particular segment of the population. 45 Finally, the threat of further review
may encourage agencies to be more thorough and careful in their
decisionmaking. 46
But judicial review also introduces significant downsides. Judicial review
tends to transfer final decisionmaking power from the Executive Branch
officials, who have some measure of political accountability, to judges “who
have no constituency.” 47 Moreover, the specialized subject-matter experts
at the federal agency are better equipped than generalist judges to make
decisions regarding the technical details of agency policy. 48
Beyond comparative competence between the branches, there is also a
significant cost to subjecting decisions to additional layers of review.
Judicial review adds a level of unpredictability and uncertainty about the
validity of agency action, which undermines reliance by all interested
parties. 49 Moreover, the availability of judicial review may distort
decisionmaking by federal agencies, who may be tempted to be overly
cautious ex ante based on fears of drawing the “worst case scenario” judge.50
This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court’s standing
jurisprudence, which expressly favors plaintiffs who are the target of a
regulation over those who experience a more attenuated effect, giving those
who would challenge agency action a ticket into court, while denying access
to those favoring additional regulation. 51 And, of course, there is the
44. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034–35 (1968) (“Neither the executive nor the legislature
is as dependable as the judiciary in making such determinations” of private rights).
45. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
46. However, even if there is a lack of judicial review, agencies remain susceptible to
presidential or congressional reversal.
47. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).
48. Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners Associations
and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 856 (2013).
49. See Cross, supra note 41, at 1249 (“[A] circuit split over the regulations of the
Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’) on granting Clean Air Act variances kept those
rules ‘in limbo for well over two years and led to different treatment of polluters in different
parts of the country.’”).
50. Id. at 1251–52 (internal quotation marks omitted); Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 F.2d
455, 457 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Because these reviewers are selected at random from a large pool,
to be really safe the ALJ [Administrative Law Judge] must please the most demanding federal
judge in the jurisdiction.”).
51. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992); Nicholas A. Fromherz
& Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After Massachusetts
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substantial financial cost to requiring courts to decide, and for agencies to
litigate these lawsuits 52—cases which compose approximately 23% of the
federal court docket. 53
Nevertheless, at least since the adoption of the APA, congressional policy
has tended to allow agency decisions to be reviewed by courts, although in
recent years there is some movement toward more limited review. 54
Congressional policy is far more varied, however, when it comes to picking
the court that will undertake the review.
B. Choice of Forum
Although the routine federal case begins and ends in district court,55
cases involving federal agencies are often different. While the default rule is
that administrative challenges begin in district court, Congress has provided
innumerable exceptions that allow a case to be commenced directly in the
court of appeals, bypassing the district court altogether. These provisions
have been enacted piecemeal over more than a century of ad hoc
legislating.
When a circuit court has jurisdiction under a specific statutory provision,
that jurisdiction is exclusive and preempts district court jurisdiction over
that claim. 56 However, in most situations, a challenge that falls outside of a
direct review provision can be brought in the federal district courts.
Notably, however, the choice of forum does not affect the standard to be
applied, as both circuit courts and district courts apply the same APA
standard to the same administrative record. 57
v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135 (2010) (“The Court has also articulated a separate
presumption against standing for individuals who are not the object of the regulation (or lack
thereof) they seek to challenge.”).
52. President Roosevelt vetoed a precursor to the APA, explaining “I am convinced
that it would produce the utmost chaos and paralysis in the administration of the
Government at this critical time. I am convinced that it is an invitation to endless and
innumerable controversies at a moment when we can least afford to spend either
governmental or private effort in the luxury of litigation.” 86 Cong. Rec. 13,943 (1940);
James C. Thomas, Fifty Years with the Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Review Remains an
Enigma, 32 TULSA L.J. 259, 281 (1996).
53. United States Courts, Caseload Statistics 2012, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscou
rts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tabl
es/B01Mar12.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
54. For example, in recent decades, Congress has expressly barred judicial review of
numerous decisions under Medicare and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 42
U.S.C § 1395l(t)(12) (2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–586 (1996).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
56. Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1993).
57. Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2001).
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1. History
The unusual divide—sometimes one court, sometimes another—is
unique to judicial review of administrative law. In part, this reflects a deep
and long-running controversy. Indeed, a debate over choice of forum for
administrative review set the stage for one of the Supreme Court’s most
famous decisions, Marbury v. Madison. 58 After scores of timeless dicta, Chief
Justice Marshall held that the Supreme Court could not issue a writ of
mandamus in an original proceeding to compel the Secretary of State to
deliver a commission to a newly appointed Justice of the Peace. 59 Instead,
the Court found, such a challenge could only be brought in a lower court. 60
Of course, Marbury says nothing about which lower court Congress may
charge with review of agency action. 61 And Congress has exercised its
discretion by providing a myriad scheme of review ever since it first
provided for statutory review of administrative action.
The idea of direct appellate court review of agency decisionmaking
traces its origins back almost to the beginning of the modern administrative
state. When Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
in the late 1800s, it made no allowance for an outside party to challenge
ICC’s action. 62 Instead, the Interstate Commerce Act placed the onus on
ICC to come to court to seek enforcement of its conclusions through a
“summary” proceeding, “without the formal pleadings and proceedings
applicable to ordinary suits in equity,” at which ICC’s findings were
intended to be prima facie proof of the facts. 63 By 1906, however, judicial
scrutiny of and hostility toward ICC decisionmaking led Congress to adopt
the Hepburn Act, which made ICC orders self-executing and shifted the
burden to an outside party to obtain judicial review. 64 In 1910, Congress
created a special Article III circuit court, the United States Commerce
Court, to review decisions of ICC, 65 but the court lasted only three years

58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
59. Id. at 175–76.
60. Id.
61. Although Congress can delegate large amounts of discretion to federal agencies, it is
an open question whether Congress can delegate its legislative authority to create Article III
courts and control their jurisdiction. Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147,
1154 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting the “constitutional questions” that might arise if a statute were
interpreted to delegate to the President the authority to bestow Article III jurisdiction on a
court).
62. Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49–104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Robert L.
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1986).
63. Interstate Commerce Act § 16, 24 Stat. at 384–85; see also Merrill, supra note 30, at
950.
64. Merrill, supra note 30, at 956–58.
65. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61–218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
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before it was widely considered a failure and thus abolished. 66 In place of
the Commerce Court, Congress provided that decisions of ICC would be
reviewed de novo in the district court by a three-judge panel, with appellate
review being available directly to the Supreme Court. 67
In 1914, Congress first provided for direct appellate court review when it
created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 68 The legislative history
provides little insight into Congress’s motivation for inventing direct circuit
review. 69 The sole rationale given for this approach was that direct circuit
court review would provide for “the speediest settlement of disputed
questions.” 70 Yet this model would be copied in some, but not all, agencies
created in the years to come.
For the next several decades, Congress variously provided for direct
circuit court review, for three-judge district court review, or for single-judge
district court review. During this era, Congress adopted some of the most
prominent examples of direct circuit court review, including for the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1933 71 and the National
Labor Relations Board in 1935. 72 Yet despite the significance of these
agencies, Congress said very little about its reasons behind its preference for
the court of appeals. The little that was said indicates simply that Congress
was copying what it had done with FTC. 73 At other times, however,
Congress provided for district court review, 74 and it was not always clear
why Congress preferred one forum over another.75

66. Merrill, supra note 30, at 966–67.
67. Pub. L. No. 63–32, 38 Stat. 208, 219–20 (1913). This arrangement exists today
only in very limited circumstances related to the Voting Rights Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)
(2012). See generally Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation,
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996).
68. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63–203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)). Perhaps not uncoincidentally, the Act also expressly
provided for appellate-style review of the agency’s decision: the decision would be reviewed
only on questions of law, and then only on the record developed by the agency. Id.
69. Evans, supra note 4, at 372 (“There is nothing in the debate in Congress . . . to
indicate that Congress was aware of the significance of the step it was taking, viewed either
as a landmark in the development of the techniques of judicial review of administrative
agencies or as a curious phenomenon in the framework of the federal judicial system.”).
70. H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.).
71. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–22, § 9(a), 48 Stat. 74, 80–81 (1933).
72. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74–198, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 449,
454–55 (1935).
73. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARISON OF S. 2926
(73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) 7 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NAIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 at 1319, 1329
(1949).
74. See Note, supra note 28, at 905–06 nn.529–30 (collecting statutes).
75. See Evans, supra note 4, at 382 (noting that the author could not discern any
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By the middle of the twentieth century, review provisions were scattered
over a dozen different statutes in several different fora. 76 The adoption of
the APA four years earlier had standardized many practices relating to
administrative review (including, notably, the standard and scope of
review), but the APA said nothing about the court in which those decisions
would be reviewed. Scholars began to criticize Congress’s ad hoc
decisionmaking. For example, in 1940, Harvard Law Professor James
Landis—who had previously spent time heading several agencies with
direct review provisions—announced that “[i]t is clear that no one can
defend today our variegated scheme for judicial review of administrative
action.” 77 As set forth below, we wholly agree with Professor Landis and
argue that the problem has grown exponentially worse since he wrote.
The closest that Congress ever came to devising a uniform system was
with the Administrative Orders Review Act in 1950, which placed initial
The
review of specified agency orders with the circuit courts.78
Administrative Orders Review Act, also known as the Hobbs Act, 79 was the
product of a years-long commission to study the administrative review
procedures then in place. The primary driver for the legislation, however,
appears to have been concern for the Supreme Court’s workload, and not
an effort to harmonize and improve the process for initial review. This is
underscored by the fact that the Administrative Orders Review Act applied
only to a small number of agency decisions, all of which had previously
been reviewed under the ICC model of a three-judge district court with
direct review to the Supreme Court. 80 A common criticism was that voiced
by Chief Justice Stone: the appeals of right to the Supreme Court in agency
review cases had burdened the Court with numerous appeals of minor
importance and merit. 81
Given the overriding concern with the Supreme Court review aspect of
pre-existing procedure, relatively little was said in the legislative history
about why circuit courts were chosen to serve as the initial forum for
consistency in Congress’s classifications).
76. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 3 (1950) (“The method of review of most of the
judicially reviewable orders of the agencies involved . . . [wa]s prescribed by many provisions
scattered throughout different statutes”); Evans, supra note 4, at 376 (discussing the lack of
any comprehensive code of judicial review of administrative orders).
77. Landis, supra note 4, at 1090; see also Evans, supra note 4, at 371 (“There was, of
course, no sense in the dual system of nisi prius courts . . . .”).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(a)–(b) (2012).
79. Pub. L. No. 81–901, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950). Not to be confused with the other,
perhaps more famous Hobbs Act, dealing with racketeering and corruption. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2012).
80. See Breck P. McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28
CALIF. L. REV. 129, 131–32 (1940).
81. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 2 (1950).
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agency challenges. 82 The bulk of the specific history argued that
assembling a three-judge district court was clumsy and that district courts
were too busy to be bothered with reviewing the actions. 83 However, the
House Committee boldly proclaimed that the procedure of initial circuit
court review with discretionary Supreme Court review was “the more
modern method and [wa]s generally considered to be the best method for
the review of orders of administrative agencies,” 84 because it eliminates
duplicative proceedings in the district court and the court of appeals. 85
Chief Judge Orie Phillips of the Tenth Circuit, principal drafter of the
Administrative Orders Review Act, identified a different concern: that
entrusting review to three-judge district courts without any right to appeal
would be unseemly. 86
Yet despite the House Committee’s confidence in its work, the
Administrative Orders Review Act was not universal, applying instead only
to a limited list of agencies. 87 Excluded agencies could be reviewed under
the terms of their organic statute or, absent a jurisdictional provision, in the
federal district courts under the APA and general federal question
jurisdiction.
2. Today
Over the last sixty years, the number of regulatory decisions subject to
challenge has sharply increased, leading to a commensurate increase in
82. See generally id.
83. Providing for the Review of Orders of Certain Agencies, and Incorporating into the Judicial Code
Certain Statutes Relating to Three-Judge District Courts: Hearings on H.R. 1468, H.R. 1470, and H.R.
2771 (80th Cong.) and H.R. 2915 & H.R. 2916 (81st Cong.) Before Subcomms. No. 3 and No. 4 of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (80th Cong.) and Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st
Cong. 65 (1949) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Harold I. Baynton, Special Assistant to
the Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“We feel that the three-judge court as presently
constituted is somewhat disrupting in the district courts. As you know, most of the district
courts are busy courts. They have ample business before them.”).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 4 (1950).
85. Id. (“The submission of the cases upon the records made before the administrative
agencies will avoid the making of two records, one before the agency and one before the
court, and thus going over the same ground twice.”).
86. See Hearings, supra note 83, at 112. As Judge Phillips put it:
We felt that there should be one review of the right in an appellate court. That is one
reason why we provided for a review in the court of appeals rather than in a threejudge district court. Not that the three judges of the district court would not do as
good a job as the court of appeals—they might do a better job, in fact—but we
thought it was sort of traditional that there should be one review of right; and, if we
were going to take away appeals of right, there ought to be hearings by the court of
appeals.
Id.
87. McAllister, supra note 80, at 131–32.
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congressional choices of forum. And Congress’s choices have varied
dramatically—without apparent rhyme or reason—from statute to statute,
year to year, and even within particular legislation. As a leading treatise
puts it, “[A] startling array of specific statutory provisions establish court of
appeals jurisdiction to review actions of agencies that range from the major
independent regulatory agencies to a large number of executive officials.”88
The treatise authors share our estimation that “[c]omplete enumeration of
the statutes probably would be impossible at any given moment, even with
the aid of sophisticated computer searches.” 89
Indeed, by our rough count, there are more than a thousand statutory
provisions sprinkled through fifty-one titles of the United States Code that
direct agency cases to a particular court. 90 Most of these provisions direct
litigants to a regional circuit court, to the D.C. Circuit, or, in limited
instances, to the Federal Circuit. 91 Thus, for example, Congress has
channeled to the circuit court most challenges to Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) decisions under the Clean Air Act and Board of Immigration
Appeals decisions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, yet
preserved some decisions in the district court under each statute. 92 There
are still further oddities within these provisions. For instance, one statute,
the Federal Election Commission Act, provides that constitutional
challenges to the election laws proceed directly to the en banc D.C. Circuit,
rather than the typical three-judge panel. 93 In addition to these provisions,
an untold number of agency decisions are left to the default route of initial
district court review.
The most recent major expansion of the administrative state came with
the 2010 creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
Except for a few narrow categories of actions which may be challenged
directly in the court of appeals, 94 including challenges brought by other
88. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3941
(3d ed. 2012).
89. Id.
90. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 377 (noting the “large number of new statutes which explicitly
provided for direct court-of-appeals review of rulemaking”).
91. For a collection of provisions just referencing the D.C. Circuit, see Eric M. Fraser
et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 154–55 (2013).
92. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 307(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(a)–(b) (2012); Legomsky, supra
note 13, at 1311–12 (discussing the INA).
93. 2 U.S.C. § 437h; see also Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(discussing § 437h).
94. E.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376, 1742 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 26(f)(2))
(stating that the decision regarding who gets an award of funds can be challenged in the
court of appeals).
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federal agencies, 95 Congress left CFPB review in the federal district
courts. 96
Few patterns emerge from the seemingly random distribution of initial
agency review between circuit and district courts, and Congress generally,
though not always, 97 declines to explain its choice of forum. 98 Even a
cursory survey can find countless examples of similar actions by different
agencies being challenged in different courts. Thus, for example, though
complex economic models are of critical importance to both, regulations of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) can be challenged
directly in the circuit court, 99 while challenges to regulations of the
Governors of the Federal Reserve System go to the district court. 100
Review of orders of the Export-Import Bank takes place in district court, 101
while challenges to SEC orders go to the circuit court, 102 though both
regulate sophisticated trading markets. Postal rates can be challenged in
the circuit court, 103 but Medicare reimbursement rates are reviewed by a
district court. 104 Decertified airline mechanics proceed directly to the
circuit court, 105 while decertified Navy instructors or body armor
manufacturers go to the district court. 106
Even within an agency or a program, it is not clear why one set of
decisions go to one forum or another. Horse Protection Act regulations can
be challenged in district court, but adjudications go to the circuit court. 107
95. Id. § 712, 124 Stat. at 1643–44 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8302(c)(1));
§ 718, 124 Stat. at 1652–54 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8306(b)). These provisions
are likely unconstitutional. See generally Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47
GA. L. REV. 1217 (2013).
96. See, e.g., Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am. v. CFPB, 907 F. Supp. 2d 112
(D.D.C. 2012); First Premier Bank v. CFPB, 819 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.S.D. 2011). For
another recent example of Congress providing for different types of review in the same
legislation, compare 47 U.S.C. § 1442(h) (district court has jurisdiction over disapproval of a
state plan), with 47 U.S.C. § 923(i)(7) (court of appeals has jurisdiction over decision of
dispute resolution board).
97. The INA is an exception. See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 224 (1963).
98. Note, supra note 7, at 999; Evans, supra note 4, at 382.
99. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 766(c).
100. E.g., NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F. Supp. 2d 85
(D.D.C. 2013).
101. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 878 F. Supp. 2d 42
(D.D.C. 2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank of the
U.S., 718 F.3d 974 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1), (b)(1).
103. 39 U.S.C. § 3663.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f).
105. 49 U.S.C. § 46110.
106. Foster v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.D.C. 2012); Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v.
United States, 2012 WL 2994111 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2012).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b). There are many similar circumstances that would likely exist,
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The rule is flipped for the Department of Energy, where regulations under
the Energy Policy Act can be challenged in the circuit court, 108 while
determinations of entitlement to Energy Star designation are brought in
district court. 109 FTC rules that purport to amend trade regulations go to
the circuit court, while FTC rules that interpret trade regulations go to the
district court—although both have the same practical effect on regulated
parties. 110 If the government prevents you from boarding an airplane, your
forum depends on whether the Transportation Security Administration or
the Federal Bureau of Investigation placed you on the no-fly list. 111
Sometimes, Congress provides for circuit court review only for particular
types of litigants. For example, Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) decisions regarding the approval of Medicaid state plans can
generally be challenged only in district court, but a state may challenge an
adverse approval decision directly in the court of appeals. 112 And
sometimes Congress has even given the litigant the option: electing circuit
court review after a lengthier administrative appeal, or proceeding to
district court after exhausting fewer than all of the administrative remedies
available. 113
Still other times, the proper forum for challenging an agency’s decision
might vary from year to year, or even day to day. For example, litigants
who wish to challenge the Department of Commerce’s actions under the
Export Administration Act must determine whether their challenge comes
at a time when the statute, including its circuit court review provision, is in
effect, or whether its rules have simply been extended by Executive Order,
which would shuttle cases to the district courts. 114
The seeming randomness of the division of initial review fora provides
scant evidence of an intelligent design. 115 Only rarely do legislative

but for the judicial interpretation of “order” in direct review provisions to include
“regulations.” See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(1).
109. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 679 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2010).
110. Funeral Consumer Alliance, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
111. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
112. Compare Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 377 (9th Cir. 2011), and Miss.
Hosp. Ass’n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 1983) (both discussing appeals of nonstate litigants who initially challenged Medicaid determinations in district court), with 42
U.S.C. § 1316(a). See also Del. Div. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 665 F. Supp. 1104, 1109–10 (D. Del. 1987) (“Before tackling the important
constitutional and statutory issues raised by a denial of Medicaid funding, the Court must
slice through a thicket of seemingly incomprehensible rules that accompany federal transfers
to the poor . . . [including] Byzantine jurisdictional standards.”).
113. 25 U.S.C. § 450m-1.
114. Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
115. Evans, supra note 4, at 382.
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histories shed any light on intent. As one might expect, legislative debate
over new agency programs tends to dwell on things other than judicial
review procedures. 116 At best, this unusual and unpredictable divide
appears to be driven by historical circumstances, committee idiosyncrasies,
or legislative compromises. Or perhaps the existence of a direct circuit
court review provision is simply the product of which piece of prior
legislation a particular staffer happened to use as a template. In any event,
although there may be compelling reasons for the placement in one forum
versus another, it appears that Congress has not given the matter much
thought.
Today, it is unknown whether the majority of agency actions are
reviewed by circuit or district courts. Commentators have variously
assumed both circuit and district courts to have the upper hand. 117 We
tend to think that most agency decisions end up in the district court as the
default rule. And we’re in good company: according to the 1990 Federal
Courts Study Committee, “administrative law experts estimate that there
may be five to eight times as many of these cases [beginning in district
courts] as there are direct appeals.”118 Although hundreds of agency
actions are expressly channeled to the circuit courts, district courts remain
the default choice for the seemingly infinite number of agency decisions for
which no forum is specified. 119 Regardless, the bottom line is that the
modern statutory scheme oscillates between initial district court review and
direct circuit court review in what often feels like an arbitrary fashion. 120

116. Id. at 374, 376 (“Throughout the history of statutes providing for administrative
action, the provision relating to the machinery and procedure of administrative action has
been subordinated to the provisions relating to the policy for which administrative
regulation was established.”).
117. Bryan C. Bond, Note, Taking it on the Chenery: Should the Principles of Chenery I Apply
in Social Security Disability Cases?, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157, 2170 (2011) (circuit court);
Jens H. Hillen, Note, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Independent Review of Patent
Decisions and the Constitutional Facts Doctrine, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 210 (1993) (circuit court);
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation
and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 225
n.142 (1990) (circuit court); Cal. Energy Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143, 1148
(9th Cir. 2009) (district court).
118. Fed. Courts Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 22 CONN. L.
REV. 733, 810–11 (1990).
119. E.g., NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Unless the
Congress has . . . expressly supplied the courts of appeals with jurisdiction to review agency
action directly, an APA challenge falls within the general federal question jurisdiction of the
district court and must be brought there ab initio.”).
120. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3941.
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3. Judicial Gloss
Given the complexity and lack of any discernable organizing principle of
this divided scheme, the Supreme Court regularly resolves jurisdictional
disputes involving review of agency action. For the last several years, an
average of one such jurisdictional case has appeared before the Court each
term. 121
And if the lower courts struggle with deciphering Congress’s
jurisdictional puzzle, it is no surprise that litigants are often unsure of where
they should bring their challenge. Litigants who guess incorrectly face the
prospect of losing out on very short deadlines, often sixty days, for bringing
an action, 122 unless they are able to convince a court to transfer the case to
the proper forum. 123 Cognizant of the risks to litigants, courts openly
advocate for challengers to agency decisions to bring their actions in both
circuit and district courts, lest they guess wrong. 124 Scholars too have noted
the difficulty of identifying the proper forum. 125
To deal with this statutory mess, courts have experimented with
jurisdictional tests to ease the confusion. 126 However, many of these
approaches relied more on the preferences and assumptions of the judges
than on any direction from Congress. 127 For example, in the 1980s, the
Supreme Court suggested that direct circuit court review should be
presumed based on what it described as “the sound policy of placing initial
APA review in the courts of appeals.” 128 But the Court made little effort to
defend, or even articulate, its view of policy—a policy often at odds with
Congress’s, as reflected in statutory language—and recent decisions have
substituted the usual tools of statutory construction for these naked policy
preferences. 129
For their part, the circuit courts have their own view of “sound policy.”
Sometimes, circuit courts read in exceptions to statutory circuit court review

121. See supra note 3.
122. There are perhaps hundreds of statutes which require a petition for review to be
filed within sixty days. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2149(c) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2012).
123. See Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
124. See Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 670 F.3d 268, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
125. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the early judicial efforts at interpreting these provisions, see
generally McAllister, supra note 80.
127. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 334 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “courts
have distorted plain statutory text in order to produce a ‘more sensible’ result” when
interpreting statutory review provisions).
128. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 745 (1985); accord, e.g., Jaunich v.
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 50 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir. 1995); Suburban
O’Hare Comm’n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1986).
129. See Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012).
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based on the nature of the claim, particularly constitutional or pattern-orpractice challenges to agency actions, 130 or the likely thoroughness of the
administrative record. 131 Other times, while simultaneously groaning about
crushing dockets, 132 circuit courts enthusiastically assume original
jurisdiction based primarily on their own policy preferences and only
loosely, and as an afterthought, on statutory language. 133 Most egregiously,
circuit courts occasionally assume direct review jurisdiction for themselves
despite the lack of any statutory basis. 134 Rather than clarifying matters,
these occasional presumptions simply add another layer of indeterminacy
upon an already uncertain jurisdictional terrain. 135
Another interpretive approach requires closer examination. Many direct
review statutes—particularly those adopted before 1950—provide for direct
review of “orders.”136 Does this allow for direct circuit court review of
regulations, or other types of agency action? 137 In the 1950s, the courts
interpreted “order” narrowly to exclude rulemaking. 138 Beginning in the
1970s, the circuit courts started interpreting “order” in direct review
130. E.g., Mace v. Skinner, 34 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1994).
131. City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
132. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1983)
(citing increases in dockets and case load).
133. E.g., Cal. Energy Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[C]onsiderations of efficiency, consistency with the congressional scheme, and judicial
economy may be employed to determine whether initial review in the circuit courts best
accomplishes the intent of Congress”); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 355
F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2004); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. FERC,
388 F.3d 903, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3940.
134. Clark v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 170 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“[T]he statute governing judicial review in the matter before us is ambiguous, since it
provides for judicial review but fails to specify the court in which such review will take place.
This alone favors the location of jurisdiction in this Court.”).
135. Jaunich v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 50 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir.
1995) (“While the analytical framework for determining whether initial review should
proceed in the court of appeals or the district court appears somewhat simple, it is often
complicated by confused case law standards or poorly drafted and ambiguous statutory
language.”).
136. Note, supra note 7, at 989–92.
137. On the one hand, “order” generally is a limited, case-specific type of directive. The
APA, for example, defines “order” to be a final disposition “other than rule making.” 5
U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012). Yet the statutory use of “order” may not say much by way of
legislative intent to limit direct review: these provisions might be anachronisms of the preAPA era when the scope and nature of review varied widely depending on the type of
agency action, or they could reflect a lack of congressional foresight into the varying ways in
which agencies would choose to act.
LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 158–59 (1965) (describing possibilities and suspecting “an
oversight”).
138. Note, supra note 7, at 989–92.
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provisions to apply to pretty much anything that the agency does—
rulemaking, manual, or any other final agency action. 139
The expansion of “order” can lead to some awkward results because
many of the direct review provisions also contain short time windows,
commonly sixty days, in which a suit must be brought. The short time
period might make sense when dealing with an adjudication leveled against
a readily defined individual, but it makes less sense when dealing with a
broad regulation. For example, there may be instances where no one has
an imminent injury from a new regulation because its application to any
particular situation is speculative. This is often the case with ambiguous
regulations, the real upshot of which cannot be grasped until the agency
moves to enforce. Moreover, even if a challenge might meet the strictures
of Article III, a regulated party may wish to choose to see how the
regulation is going to be implemented or applied to it before immediately
filing suit. The expansion of “order” to cover any and all agency action not
only stretches statutory text, but it can also hamper the efficient
administration of justice.
The recent trend, however, is to follow the language of the direct review
provisions more literally and to interpret “order” narrowly, leaving
challenges to other actions to the district court. 140 Although courts may
have sought to provide clarity, departing from the text of the statutory
provisions has introduced more confusion and disparities between similarly
worded statutes. The upshot is that simply identifying a statutory provision
is not enough for litigants to find a home for their challenge; they also must
determine how the relevant courts have interpreted that particular
provision.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has charted a new path, favoring
clear dividing lines and easy tests for determining where an action belongs,
rather than the unpredictable analysis of the nature of the claim. For
example, in Elgin v. Department of Treasury, the Supreme Court held that any
personnel action cognizable under the Civil Service Reform Act—even a
constitutional claim for injunctive relief against a statute—can only be
brought directly to the Federal Circuit. 141 This was a clear improvement
over decades of circuit case law that instead scrutinized the nature of the
claim before allowing some to proceed in district court. 142 As the Elgin
Court emphasized, the discarded claim-based jurisdictional rule “would
139. See, e.g., Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 598–600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(holding that a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advisory circular is an “order” for
purposes of a statutory review provision); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309
(8th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases).
140. E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
141. 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012); see also Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012).
142. See, e.g., Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229–30 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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deprive the aggrieved employee, the [agency], and the district court of clear
guidance about the proper forum for the employee’s claims at the outset of
the case.” 143
In sum, despite the courts’ efforts, the United States Code remains a
complicated maze for would-be challengers of agency action, largely
providing for judicial review but varying unpredictably the forum in which
the review will take place.
II. WHICH COURT(S) SHOULD REVIEW THE EXECUTIVE?
Congress may not carefully consider its jurisdictional choices, but that
need not stop us from giving the question a close look. In this Part, we
catalog the various arguments that have been or might be offered to
support a particular jurisdictional scheme. Given the frequency with which
circuit courts are charged with direct review of an agency decision, we
would expect that the benefits of direct review would be well established.
But they are not. 144 To fill the gap, we utilize and expand prior scholarship
on the structure of judicial hierarchies, and we ask which jurisdictional
system achieves the optimal balance between accuracy and cost, while also
taking into account other factors that may be relevant to the design of the
ideal system. We ultimately conclude that broad claims in favor of initial
circuit court review are unsupported at present.
We identify several arguments that could be raised in favor of direct
circuit court review: the need to distribute workload, the unsuitability of
district court rules for reviewing agency decisions, the need for authoritative
resolution of legal disputes, seemliness, efficiency of a direct route to the
court of appeals, and accuracy. Many of these arguments—most notably,
seemliness and authoritativeness—are at best only arguments for circuit
court involvement at some stage in the case, such as on appeal, and say
nothing by their own force about whether that role should be at the
beginning or the end of a case. Only efficiency and accuracy plausibly
justify a case proceeding directly to the court of appeals, and then only
under assumptions that we think are unlikely to hold true in reality.
No balancing would be complete without considering the costs of
jurisdictional ambiguity. And these costs, in our view, are fatal to the
current design. Rather than attempt to chase uncertain marginal gains by
tailoring jurisdiction based on guesses about the future, we propose a single,
uniform standard to simplify matters for future litigants. At the very least,
we urge efforts to seek simple, predictable rules.

143. Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2135.
144. But see Currie & Goodman, supra note 13.
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A. Legitimacy/Seemliness
A surprisingly persistent argument in favor of circuit court involvement is
seemliness: the perceived legitimacy of judicial review depends on the
availability of a court of appeals. 145
This argument falters on several levels. On the definitional level,
“seemliness” is a particularly squishy concept, 146 and advocates of this
perspective have done little to impart substance or justify why it should
matter. 147 Our best effort to construct the argument is that (1) a major goal
of the judicial system should be to convince litigants and the public that
justice is being served, and (2) litigants or the public might view a district
judge reviewing an administrative agency as somehow illegitimate or less
legitimate. While the former premise is debatable, the latter is wholly
unjustified.
First, the supposed unseemliness of district court review would seem to
be resolved by the availability of the circuit court to conduct appellate
review. If litigants would not credit the say of a single district judge, they
could invoke their right to appeal and have their chance to proceed in the
circuit court.
But perhaps the availability of eventual review by a circuit court would
not solve the problem. Perhaps “it would be unseemly and demeaning for
a single district judge to set aside the decisions of an expert administrative
agency . . . .” 148 The prospect of appeal, one could argue, does not cure the
initial indignity of an agency being forced to answer to a single judge, nor
does it eliminate the disrespect from a single judge setting aside a duly
enacted regulation. The harm is done, so goes the argument, even if the
agency later receives the respect it deserves through an encounter with the
circuit court.
This line of reasoning seems almost self-refuting. After all, district judges
can enjoin acts of Congress and state legislation, and review in these
situations would seem to raise even more powerful concerns with

145. Schorr, supra note 13, at 797 (“[T]he high stature of the court of appeals generally
makes it the preferred forum . . . .”); Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 14.
146. Supporters of the Administrative Orders Review Act argued that seemliness
required the rejection of three-judge district court review in favor of single-tier, three-judge
circuit court review. Hearings, supra note 83, at 112 (“[I]f we were going to take away appeals
of right, there ought to be hearings by the court of appeals.”). Thus, according to the
promoters of the Act, seemliness requires the right to proceed in a court called a “court of
appeals.” This nomenclature preference is hardly a solid basis on which to base a
jurisdictional system. We think a more persuasive—but still unconvincing—iteration would
be that seemliness is satisfied by a multi-membered court but not a single judge.
147. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 14.
148. Id.
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seemliness. 149 If it is unseemly for a district judge to second-guess an
administrative body, how should we feel about a single district judge
striking down federal or state legislation as unconstitutional? The
seemliness argument would erode judicial review by district courts to the
vanishing point. 150
At any rate, today’s system involves numerous agency decisions subject
to review without widespread alarm over the system’s legitimacy. As an
empirical matter, we are just not convinced that many litigants, be they
agencies or challenging parties, feel review by a district court is somehow
beneath them.
Not only do we doubt that litigants would question the legitimacy of
initial district court review, but we question how much weight litigant
preferences should be given. The mere fact that things were previously
done a certain way is not a sufficient reason to continue down the same
path. The bar may be programmed by experience to expect a certain
jurisdictional scheme, but lawyers, particularly the specialized breed that
practice administrative law, can adapt. Indeed, for many years in this
country, the idea that a single judge could issue final, unappealable rulings
was common. 151 In fact, there have been a number of serious—though
controversial—proposals to limit circuit court appellate review of district
court judgments, 152 and some have suggested that litigants should have less
149. Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District
Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101 (2008).
150. An interesting twist on this argument was recently articulated by Aaron-Andrew
Bruhl. Bruhl, supra note 18. Laying out the case for hierarchically variable deference to
agency interpretations, Bruhl notes that, to the extent judicial review bleeds into
policymaking, courts with a stronger democratic pedigree have a better claim to the robust
exercise of judicial review (i.e., in a way that accords little deference to agency calls). See id.
at 743–48. If a main argument in favor of judicial deference is that the President and his
agents, as politically elected and accountable policymakers, are entitled to a significant
degree of latitude within statutory bounds, then it might follow that politically vetted judges
have a stronger claim to judicial review that tinkers with national policy. Id. From this
perspective, the Supreme Court has the strongest claim, sounding in political or democratic
pedigree, to revisit agency interpretations, at least when those interpretations implicate
national policy. Id. District courts ought to be the most deferential under this rubric, with
the circuit courts occupying a middle ground. Id.
151. Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603 (1985).
152. E.g., Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 40
Fed. Reg. 27,925, 27,927 (1975); accord, e.g., David R. Cleveland, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of
Federal Court Reform, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 60 (2013); Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review
During Immigration Reform: The Certificate of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499 (2008); Immigration
Law—Administrative Adjudication—Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration
Courts.—Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005), and Benslimane v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), Recent Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2600–01
(2006); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts,
1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 (1996); Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Asks Limit to Automatic Appeals,
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of an expectation of having a two-tier judiciary when it comes to review of
agency decisions. 153 We see little risk of the public losing faith in the
judiciary were administrative cases assigned to the same track as all other
matters.
B. Workload Distribution
Dividing initial review between district and circuit courts could also be a
response to a labor shortage. Lawsuits challenging agency decisions
account for a decent share of the federal docket, 154 and some of them can
be quite labor-intensive. If Congress felt that district judges were,
compared to their colleagues on the circuit courts, facing heavier dockets,
then Congress might see fit to balance the scales by shifting some cases to
the circuit courts. The impetus here would not be the notion that circuit
courts are more competent, but simply that they have a surplus of labor
resources compared to the district courts.
Although we have not identified evidence that Congress had this in mind
with respect to any of its allocation choices, there is evidence that this could
have been a factor. In 1930, there were sixty-four case filings—not just
administrative law cases, but cases of all stripes—per circuit judge, while
there were nearly one thousand per district judge. 155 As Figure 1 shows,
the ratio has become much less lopsided over the years. As it now stands,
the ratio of district court filings to circuit court filings is in the
neighborhood of two to one.
Correlation is not causation, much less evidence of Congress’s
motivation. That being said, it does not seem entirely far-fetched to
suppose that some members of Congress were aware of the uneven
workloads and sought to correct that asymmetry by tinkering with the
jurisdictional scheme. For instance, although the legislative history of the
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/16/us/rehnquist-askslimit-to-automatic-appeals.html.
153. Denberg v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 696 F.2d 1193, 1196 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]o allow
someone seeking judicial review of administrative action to get that review in the district
court with a right of appeal to the court of appeals is to give him two judicial reviews of
administrative action.
That is too much . . . .”); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 176 (1973) (“The argument would be that it is enough to
grant an aggrieved citizen one judicial look at the action of a disinterested governmental
agency . . . .”). Indeed, the APA’s stingy scope of review generally prescribes only a limited
right to challenge agency action, and this right can be and, at times, has been removed by
Congress at will. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345–48 (1984).
154. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts and Expanding
Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 477–78 (2009).
155. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT 14 TBL. 2-3 (1998), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/
final/appstruc.pdf.
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Administrative Orders Review Act does not suggest this rationale, 156 it is
possible that it was in the back of lawmakers’ minds. Even in 1950, when
the Act took effect, the ratio was still about six to one.

Figure 1: Historical Workload Per Judgeship157
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But whether or not Congress was trying to balance workloads, the
problem is that it seems like such an odd way for Congress to respond. If
Congress felt district judges were swamped, why not just create more
judgeships?158 Jurisdictional choices last much longer than the cyclical ebbs
and flows of case filings, making them a particularly awkward method of
balancing work between the courts. For example, perhaps in 1930 it made
sense to shift workload to the relatively underworked circuit courts. But
things have changed since 1930, and during the past three decades,
commentators have widely complained that the circuit courts are
overwhelmed with work. 159 Yet direct review statutes exacerbate this
156. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122 (1950).
157. The ratio is arithmetically calculated based on reported numbers. United States
Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures 2012, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
JudicialFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures-2012.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014);
COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note
155, at 14.
158. The usual reasons for not adding judgeships are concerns that the majority party
will pack the new seats with ideologically biased judges or that more judgeships will water
down the prestige of the judiciary. Bruce Moyer, Will Congress Add More Federal Judgeships?,
FED. LAW., June 2009, at 10; Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the
Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 68 (1990).
159. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over
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problem by committing circuit court resources to every direct review case
that is filed.
C. District Court Rulemaking
One argument that could be made in favor of direct circuit court review
is that district court procedures are ill-suited to the review of agency
decisions. 160 “Although appeals of federal agency decisions are generally
heard by federal district courts, they do not fit comfortably within the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 161 This is largely because the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules) are built to resolve factual disputes.
But there are usually no factual disputes in APA cases—only legal
arguments about the agency’s fact-finding. Thus, for example, discovery is
contemplated through rules requiring mandatory disclosures and a
scheduling conference, 162 but under the APA, the record is the one
compiled by the agency, not a new one created before the court. 163
Without a better approach available, courts generally resort to resolving
APA cases through cross-motions for summary judgment. Although
effective, this approach can tempt courts into misapplying the summary
judgment standard (are there genuine issues of material fact?) instead of the
APA standard (is the agency view arbitrary and capricious based on the
evidence that it had before it at the time of the decision?). Indeed, because
there are no factual disputes, even a complaint and answer are unnecessary
distractions in APA cases, which is why sophisticated courts waive the
answer and allow parties to proceed directly to briefing on the merits. Trial
lawyers and judges who are accustomed to discovery but unaccustomed to
administrative review may struggle to reconcile the diverging standards. 164
In contrast, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are well-tailored to
the appellate-like quality of APA cases. In fact, the appellate rules contain
several rules specifically tailored to administrative cases. 165 These rules
contemplate a straightforward briefing schedule based on the
administrative record, exactly as the APA contemplates.
In a typical case, then, the appellate rules may be a better match for
review under the APA. But there are times when the agency’s
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1673 (2005); POSNER, supra note 1.
160. We are grateful to Matt Lawrence for this point.
161. W. Cory Haller & Karen E. Robertson, Untangling Federal Administrative Appeals
Practice in the District of Colorado, COLO. LAW., March 2013, at 31.
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
163. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
164. Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 204
(1974) (“And while the district court could act like a court of appeals by deciding motions for
summary judgment, there is always a disruptive potential for lengthy trial . . . .”).
165. FED. R. APP. P. 15–20.
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administrative record is not controlling, and the comparatively robust civil
rules make district courts the premiere triers of fact. To the extent that
facts are at play in an administrative review case, we think the district
courts’ advantage here would be dispositive. 166 And often facts are at play.
First, a litigant must establish the requisite standing, which in turn requires
that the litigant establish an injury “in fact,” an increasingly important
aspect of judicial review since the time of Professors Currie and Goodman’s
analysis. 167 Factual disputes regarding a party’s standing often cannot be
assessed on the administrative record. 168 Second, although there is a
presumption that the record supplied by the agency is complete, the
challenging party may overcome this presumption with clear evidence that
the record fails to include documents or materials considered by the agency
in reaching its decision. 169 In district court, such disputes are handled
through the familiar tool of a motion to compel. 170 In at least some circuit
courts, however, the parties are directed to brief these issues right along
with the merits. The problem with this approach, of course, is that
challenging parties presumably need this information to make their case on
the merits. Moreover, if a party seeks preliminary relief before the agency
has had time to submit a record—a common tactic by plaintiffs—the court
will have to balance whatever evidence is available at the time to determine
whether agency action should be stayed. Finally, the Supreme Court itself
has suggested, though never held, that there may be due process issues if a
litigant lacks an opportunity to develop facts necessary to a constitutional
claim by depriving him of a district court forum, 171 although subsequent
decisions have sharply limited these suggestions. 172 These situations should
be relatively rare, but when they arise, district courts are natural candidates
to resolve the factual issues.
Of course, statutes could provide express mechanisms for referring
factual disputes to an appropriate arbiter of facts, such as a district court, a
special master, or the agency. 173 Indeed, at least one statute providing for
166. See Elias, supra note 13, at 1016.
167. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992); see infra Part II.D.–F.
(offering further discussion of the work of Currie and Goodman).
168. Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
957, 959 (2010).
169. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bar
MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993).
170. See, e.g., Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo.
2010).
171. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1991); Reno v.
Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
172. Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
173. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3943.
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direct circuit court review expressly contemplates referral of factual disputes
to district court. 174 But these processes are likely more awkward, leading to
considerable delay, than simply having the district court step in to resolve
any factual disputes in the first place. 175
Although district court procedures may, at present, be clumsy when it
comes to most administrative cases, this can and should be changed.
Indeed, it is surprising that the Civil Rules have persisted virtually oblivious
to the uniqueness of record review cases despite the large number of such
cases that come before the district courts. Nevertheless, many districts
have, by local rule, recognized that record review cases require different
procedures than run-of-the-mill cases. Many, but not all, local rules
categorically excuse record review cases from formulating a discovery
plan. 176 The District of Colorado has a distinct set of rules for
administrative cases that appropriately bypasses discovery and proceeds
directly to a briefing schedule. 177 Even within the confines of the Civil
Rules, district judges can exercise their discretion to modify the procedures
to tailor them to the APA case before them. Although these efforts vary
from district to district and judge to judge, they point a path toward better
district court accommodation of administrative cases.
D. Authoritativeness
Another common argument for direct circuit court review relies on a
cited need for authoritative resolution of the challenge. 178 Circuit courts,
under this argument, are fewer in number, generally cover a broader
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3) (2012). A similar provision allows the circuit courts to
remand to the agency for further factual development. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c).
175. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593–94 (1980) (“It may be seriously
questioned whether the overall time lost by court of appeals remands to EPA
[Environmental Protection Agency] of those cases in which the records are inadequate
would exceed the time saved by forgoing in every case initial review in a district court.”).
176. D.D.C. R. 16.3(b)(1) (exempting “an action for review on an administrative
record”); see also Commentary to FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (“Logical candidates for [exemption
from scheduling orders] include . . . reviews of certain administrative actions.”). In 2013, the
Rules Committee deferred discussion on potentially amending the Civil Rules to prescribe a
national set of cases that are exempt from these requirements. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES, MEETING AGENDA 80–81 (Apr. 11–12, 2013), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2013-04.pdf.
177. D.C. COLO. LAPR § III; see also Haller & Robertson, supra note 161, at 31–32.
178. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.2d 400, 405 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (“National uniformity, an important goal in dealing with broad regulations, is best
served by initial review in a court of appeals.”); Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 13, at 781
(“Article III appellate court jurisdiction of these issues is essential, both for constitutional
reasons and for developing precedent on important legal questions.”); Schorr, supra note 13,
at 796; Bruhl, supra note 18, at 749.
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geographical region, and, under the law of the circuit doctrine, issue
authoritative decisions which are binding law on all judges in the circuit
absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention. According to Currie and
Goodman, “the decisive advantage of the court of appeals is its capacity to
develop and maintain a coherent, reliable and uniform case law for a fairly
large geographical region.” 179 This argument has only limited traction.
To begin, the relative authoritativeness of circuit courts is helpful only
when an agency decision will generate more than a single suit. Once the
judiciary resolves a challenge to an agency’s fact-laden denial of benefits to
a particular individual, for example, there is closure on that particular
dispute through ordinary application of res judicata. It matters not whether
such an individualized matter is settled with fanfare by the Supreme Court
or through an unappealed judgment from an obscure magistrate; the
precedential effect of the decision for other cases has no bearing on the
conclusiveness of the judiciary’s resolution of the particular challenge that
was brought. When no further challenges are expected, there is little value
in creating binding precedent on the specific agency decision being
challenged.
But certain types of agency decisions may apply broadly—rulemaking,
for example, may affect millions—and multiple challenges may be
expected. It serves no one’s interest if the judiciary has to resolve anew
hundreds of individual challenges to the same regulation. Not only is it
costly to redo the same legal analysis over and over again, but the risk of
differing results depending on which judge or judges happen to be assigned
undermines confidence in the rule of law and violates the norm of equal
justice. 180 Differing rulings can also throw a regulatory regime into chaos.
For agency decisions subject to multiple and possible future challenges, the
judiciary can speak authoritatively on the permissibility of the agency
decision only through creating precedent. 181 Circuit courts, based on their
comparatively broader geographical scope, fewer numbers, and stronger
rules of precedent (published circuit court opinions bind future panels of
that court), are better able to issue definitive rulings than the geographically
Rules of cross-circuit
limited and numerous district courts. 182
179. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 15.
180. Mead, supra note 30, at 812–13. Bruhl considers this to be another justification for
deference in the lower courts but not in the Supreme Court. If lower courts, and especially
district courts, did not grant significant deference to agency interpretations, national
regulatory policy would be severely threatened. On the other hand, because the Supreme
Court’s ruling is binding on the whole nation, the concern over uniformity does nothing to
justify deference by our highest court. Bruhl, supra note 18, at 749.
181. Consolidation before a single court would work to conclusively resolve all currently
pending cases but would not bind future litigants.
182. Mead, supra note 30.
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consolidation, such as that contained in the Administrative Orders Review
Act, or limited venue, such as the Clean Air Act’s channeling of all
challenges to the D.C. Circuit, 183 further facilitate uniform and conclusive
decisionmaking. However, it bears noting that nothing would prohibit
district courts from benefiting from the same types of procedures. 184
The purported finality of circuit court rulings is, in many ways, illusory.
True, the circuit court will, absent Supreme Court intervention, finally
resolve the particular controversy between the agency and the challenging
party. But there are a dozen regional circuits, which often gives rise to
inter-circuit disagreements. When one circuit upholds a regulation, but
another strikes it down, the status of the agency’s rule is particularly
uncertain. 185 Further, even within a circuit, the conclusiveness of circuit
law is undermined by the ability of motivated jurists to distinguish prior
cases, often on dubious grounds. 186 Moreover, agencies have legal
authority to refuse to follow circuit law to which they object, although
subsequent challenges to agency non-acquiescence in circuits with adverse
precedent should be pre-ordained victories for the challengers. 187
Only by placing review in a single court, 188 as is often done with the D.C.
Circuit, 189 can Congress actually provide any measure of uniformity in
decisionmaking. 190 Such concentration of review has some advantages. In
particular, agencies have a better idea who will be reviewing their decisions
and can tailor their decisionmaking process to the law of that circuit and

183. Fraser et al., supra note 91; see also S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 41 (1970) (citing the
desire for “even and consistent national application”).
184. Congress could designate a single district court to hear all challenges nationwide to
agency action, as it previously did with mandamus jurisdiction and the District of Columbia
district court; if this district court adopted a rule of precedent, and no appeal were available,
then its review of an agency’s rule would enjoy even greater weight than that of a regional
circuit today.
185. Cross, supra note 41, at 1249 (“[A] circuit split over the regulations of the
Environmental Protection Agency . . . on granting Clean Air Act variances kept those rules
‘in limbo for well over two years and led to different treatment of polluters in different parts
of the country.’”).
186. Mead, supra note 30, at 798.
187. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
188. Note that it is irrelevant whether this court is designated as a circuit, district, or
something else.
189. Fraser et al., supra note 91.
190. Landis, supra note 4, at 1087 (“The purpose of thus centralizing review over actions
always national in their scope and involving a consideration of the interrelation of other
claimants in one integrated system of radio network seems obvious.”); S. REP. NO. 91-1196,
at 41 (1970) (“Because many of these administrative actions are national in scope and
require even and consistent national application, the provision specifies that any review of
such actions shall be in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.”).
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the peculiarities of those judges. 191 It also mitigates the temptation for
litigants to forum shop. These advantages motivate occasional calls for a
specialized administrative court. 192
But a single court also has serious drawbacks, and most scholars come
out sharply against a specialized administrative court. 193 Were too many
decisions entrusted to a single court, the size of the court would have to be
dramatically expanded, likely rendering the maintenance of a uniform
jurisprudence impossible. 194 Moreover, relying on a single court limits the
opportunities for circuit splits to develop. Although circuit splits cause
headaches for litigants (“splitting” headaches, as it were), they are
sometimes a necessary evil. Inter-circuit dialogue can serve to tease out
Further, excessive
nuance that might otherwise go undetected.195
concentration can lead to a de facto specialty court, which may be overly
confident in its knowledge and therefore exceed the proper scope of
review 196 or acquire tunnel vision that prevents the judges from looking at
decisions from a broader perspective. 197
Closely related to authoritativeness is lawmaking. The distinction lies in
the subtle difference between settling particular disputes with authority, on
191. Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Because these reviewers
are selected at random from a large pool, to be really safe the ALJ must please the most
demanding federal judge in the jurisdiction.”); Cross, supra note 41, at 1251–52; James Craig
Peacock, An Anomalous and Topsy-Turvy Appellate System, 19 A.B.A. J. 11, 14–16 (1933).
192. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377
(1990) (collecting authorities); O.R. McGuire, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 22
A.B.A. J. 197 (1936).
193. POSNER, supra note 1, at 148; FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 188; Richard L. Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990);
Currie & Goodman, supra note 13. The experience of the Federal Circuit—a specialized
appellate court that hears narrow classes of cases relating to patents, federal employees, and
government contracts—is decidedly mixed, with no small amount of scholarly and
practitioner skepticism of the court’s performance. E.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The
Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 275, 281 (2012); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004). But see Harold
H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 329 (1991)
(advocating for the “creation of a new administrative court with jurisdiction over cases
meeting certain criteria”). Bruff’s article deserves particular mention for the comprehensive
framework it employs to analyze the historical origins and the costs and benefits of
specialized courts.
194. Fed. Courts Study Comm., supra note 118, at 810–11.
195. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule
of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 550 (2006).
196. The conventional wisdom is that overly eager review doomed the specialized but
very short-lived Interstate Commerce Court. FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 188.
197. POSNER, supra note 1, at 155–60; Harold Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design,
Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 UCLA L. REV. 432, 444 (1976).
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the one hand, and, on the other, providing guidance to the lower courts—
and in this case, administrative agencies—on what the law is. 198 The
lawmaking function of courts has been most strongly associated with
appellate courts, and especially the Supreme Court. 199 It occurs when a
court uses the occasion of the dispute as an opportunity to refine the law or
declare its contours with more precision.200 The relatively strong rules of
precedent and broader geographical scope allow circuit courts to more
readily pronounce rules of law to govern future agency decisionmaking.
Yet the supposed need for circuit court lawmaking is, at most, a weak
argument for direct circuit court review, as opposed to eventual review on
appeal. It is unlikely that a particular controversial issue will be insulated
from circuit court review indefinitely, as a litigant will, sooner or later, file
an appeal and allow the circuit court to announce its legal rule. Moreover,
lawmaking is less important in the administrative review context than in
most cases. Cases such as Brand X emphasize that the judiciary’s usual role
in developing the law is shared with administrative agencies, which can
trump the judiciary on many questions of law through delegated power
from the legislature. 201
To recap, although it is important not to overstate the conclusiveness of
circuit precedent, circuit courts do issue more definitive statements of law
than district courts, and this finality can be useful when an agency decision
applies broadly and is susceptible to multiple challenges. However, the
precedent-setting feature of circuit courts becomes far less useful when the
agency decision under review is a fact-specific adjudication that applies only
to a particular controversy—yet Congress often places this latter type of
agency action directly in the circuit court. 202

E. Efficiency Gains
The primary argument in favor of direct circuit court review is
efficiency. 203 For those cases that are likely to be appealed anyway, the
argument goes, it would be wasteful, redundant, and would delay final
198. See Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395,
1402 (2000) (“The Court is expected not only to determine the victor in the specific lawsuit
before it, but also to provide standards to guide lower courts in disposing of similar
controversies that may arise in the future.”).
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
202. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2012).
203. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 4.
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resolution of the matter 204 to have a district judge opine on the subject
first. 205 Because both the district court and the circuit court review agency
decisions with the same level of deference and on the same record, the
thinking goes, there is no point in subjecting a decision to the district court
when the circuit court will simply repeat the exercise on appeal. In fact, the
Supreme Court once disdainfully described a two-tier system as “wasteful
and irrational.” 206 That comment would seem to apply not only to the
courts’ resources but also to those of litigants.
Efficiency, however, fails to live up to its promise. Even under its own
terms, efficiency favors direct circuit court review only when there is a
strong chance of eventual appeal. Logic and experience teach us, however,
that most cases are not destined for appeal.
1. The Uncertain Prospects of Appeal
Initial circuit court review is only a cost-saver when there is an appeal. 207
204. E.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (“The most obvious
advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a
district court, followed by a second review on appeal.”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at
§ 3943 (“Direct action in the court of appeals, moreover, is likely to prove more expeditious
than action by a district judge followed by review in the court of appeals.”).
205. Gen. Elec. Uranium Mgmt. Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 764 F.2d 896, 903–04 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (“[E]xclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals avoids duplicative review and the
attendant delay and expense involved . . . . [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction in the
courts of appeals promotes the congressional goals of efficiency and predictability.”); 40 Fed.
Reg. 27,925, 27,927 (1975) (“[D]irect review by the courts of appeals, where feasible, is
generally desirable in the interest of efficiency and economy, as respects both litigants and
the judicial system.”); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 4 (1950) (“[T]he submission of the cases
upon the records made before the administrative agencies will avoid the making of two
records, one before the agency and one before the court, and thus going over the same
ground twice.”); Levy, supra note 13, at 513 (“The most obvious and compelling reason to
limit review [to direct circuit court review] is the savings of judicial resources.”).
206. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 445 (1988).
207. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1325–26. It is possible that litigants would be deterred
from bringing a petition directly to the circuit court that they would have brought to the
district court. This might happen in two situations. First, if circuit courts were significantly
more expensive to the litigant than district courts, a litigant might be more willing to file suit
in district court (assuming jurisdiction). This may have been a larger concern in the past
when proximity to the court house was important, but the invention of electronic filing has
probably equalized the financial costs of each court. If anything, if district courts allow
discovery when circuit courts would not, district courts could actually cost litigants more.
Currie & Goodman, supra note 13. Second, litigants may be wary of proceeding to the
circuit court if they are afraid of setting a bad precedent that will bind future litigants. This
concern should only apply to repeat, institutional litigants; attorneys with individual clients
are ethically bound to consider that case in isolation. Moreover, repeat litigants, such as
nonprofit advocacy groups, regulated businesses, and governments, face a similar dilemma
even in the district court, as the controversy could eventually be elevated to the circuit court.
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If no appeal is had, district court review is a clear bargain compared to
initial circuit court review. After all, initial circuit court review commits
three judges’ efforts to a challenge; district court review demands only a
single judge’s attention. The calculus changes when an appeal is likely to
be filed from a district judge’s ruling. Here, the time spent in the district
court is cumulative. This adds not only the cost of an additional judge, but
also requires the challenging party and the government to pay counsel to
litigate the issues twice. The key point is that direct review by a circuit
court is a cost-saver only for cases that would otherwise go up on appeal; in
all other cases, direct review by the circuit court is more expensive.
It would be foolish to assume that all, or even most, cases will be
appealed eventually. Many litigants who begin in district court are content
to end there. This is true even for challenges to final agency action. For
instance, before all deportation orders were channeled to the court of
appeals, aliens appealed around 17% of district court judgments. 208 Today,
less than 5% of district court judgments in social security cases make it to
the court of appeals. 209 Were these cases to be placed at the circuit court,
three judges would have spent time when, under the litigants’ apparent
preferences, one would suffice.
Of course, we cannot know ex ante whether a particular case is going to
be appealed, but we can make some guesses based on classes of cases. 210
Direct circuit review could be justified on costs only when there is a
sufficiently high appeal rate. How high is high enough? To answer that
question, we must compare costs between the district court and circuit
court.
Quantifying the costs with precision is not easy. Even just considering
costs to the judiciary alone, it is not as simple as treating each circuit judge
as being as expensive as a district judge. Circuit panels leverage microeconomies of scale by assigning one judge to write the panel’s opinion and
pooling law clerk analyses. 211 Yet it is equally clear that circuit courts are
pricier than district courts, as three judges still must coordinate their

208. See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1353–54, 1402 (showing appeals for only eleven out
of sixty-six deportation cases filed in the district court in 1984).
209. Compare United States Courts, Table C-4 U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by
Nature of Suit and Action Taken, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/C04Mar12.pdf
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing a total of 14,998 Social Security suits), with United States
Courts, Table B-7, U.S. Courts of Appeals-Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising From the U.S.
District Courts, by Circuit, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B07Mar12.pdf
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing a total of 570 Social Security appeals).
210. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1326.
211. Id.
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schedules, read briefs, attend oral argument, and otherwise spend the time
to become sufficiently familiar with the case to render a judgment.212 In
other words, circuit courts spend between one and three “judge units” on
each case. 213
Making a precise comparison between the costs to courts is neither
possible nor wise, but it is possible to make a rough estimate. Using data
available from the United States Courts website, 214 we approximate relative
time costs by comparing the ratio of cases per authorized judgeship at each
level. 215 In 2012, there were 550 cases filed in district court per district
judge, and 321 circuit cases per circuit judge. We assume that, on average,
district and circuit judges spend an equal amount of time on resolving cases
(that is, judges in one tier are not lazier than another). 216 Yet each district

212. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 13 (arguing that district courts can be more
readily expanded than circuit courts based on their view that circuit courts cannot be
expanded beyond nine judges and effectively maintain a uniform jurisprudence). Whatever
merit this contention may have as a matter of theory, it bears little relation to the realities of
modern life, where circuit courts regularly exceed nine judges. The Ninth Circuit, in fact,
has twenty-nine active judges. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, The
Judges of this Court in Order of Seniority, USCOURTS.GOV (Dec. 1, 2014), http://cdn.ca9.us
courts.gov/datastore/uploads/general/judgeWeb.pdf.
213. Circuit judges are slightly more costly than district judges in financial terms as well:
circuit judges get paid slightly more and enjoy an extra law clerk compared to district judges.
See United States Courts, Judicial Salaries Since 1968, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.
gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialCompensation/judicial-salaries-since-1968.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 25, 2015) (listing 2015 salaries as $201,100 for district judges and $213,230 for
circuit judges); Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of Citation
Practices in the Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 51, 71–72 (describing
the increase in clerk resources for circuit judges). From the taxpayer’s perspective, this
would also need to be included in the calculus.
214. United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
215. This is, admittedly, an imperfect measure. We consider cases filed rather than
resolved on the merits because district courts often spend considerable effort on cases before
settlement. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Secs. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(chronicling more than three years of complex litigation before a settlement was reached).
Moreover, some authorized judgeships are left vacant. See Heckler & Koch, Inc. v. Li, No.
1:09–cv–0748–WTL–JMS, 2009 WL 4842843, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2009) (discussing
vacancies in two districts). And some work at each level is performed by senior judges who
do not count toward the number of authorized judgeships. Ruggero J. Aldisert, A
Nonagenarian Discusses Life as a Senior Circuit Judge, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 183, 188 (2013).
Nevertheless, we assume that these variables are not skewed in favor of one court or another.
One factor that probably understates the cost of circuit courts is the practice of district judges
sitting by designation and helping with the appellate workload. However, we think our
approach provides a rough approximation of relative cost.
216. In reality, of course, one case may be easy, and one may be hard, and circuit courts
may spend their time on different matters than district judges. But the goal here is to
compare how much time is spent on each case on average, not how that time is allocated
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judge is assigned more cases than each circuit judge. This means that
circuit courts are devoting more “judge-units” to each case than district
courts, as we would expect. To quantify this, in 2012, circuit courts were
spending 1.7 judges per case for every 1 judge per case spent by district
courts. This makes district courts about 58% as expensive as circuit courts.
This figure is not too far away from a prior effort, which estimated that
district court resolution of a case is 1/3 cheaper than circuit courts based on
a rough assumption of how circuit courts spend their time.217 These
estimates require an appeal rate of at least 33–42% to warrant direct circuit
court review.
So far, we have treated the cost of circuit court review as a constant
variable, regardless of whether it is acting in an original or appellate
capacity. But this assumption might not hold true in reality. A circuit
court could spend less time on matters when acting in an appellate
capacity, since it could be guided by the opinion of the district judge. Or,
as we explore in greater detail below, a circuit court also might give appeals
from district judges less rigorous review if it is satisfied that the challenger
has already been treated to substantial Article III review. This could be the
case despite the appellate court’s recitation of a de novo standard of review
vis-à-vis the district court decision. 218 On the other hand, cases that have
completed their run through the district court but remain in contention on
appeal might be more difficult cases that require extra effort. 219
The analysis up to this point has primarily focused on the costs to the
judiciary. But, of course, the litigants’ costs are worth something too. In a
prior age, physical proximity to the courthouse was an important factor,
making district courts a cheaper forum. 220 Today, however, electronic
filing and the ease of travel make the costs of litigating an administrative
case approximately the same regardless of forum. Yet it is considerably
more expensive to litigate a matter in two courts rather than one. Granted,
among cases or activities. However, to the extent that administrative review cases are more
or less expensive than an average case at one level or another, then that could affect the
comparison. Administrative review cases might be more costly than the average district
court case because there are more difficult legal issues, and they are less likely to settle, or
they might be cheaper because there is a more streamlined process that does not require
discovery, extensive motion practice, and a trial.
217. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 9.
218. As scholars have noted in a variety of contexts, the actual content of a given
standard is not always reflected in its name. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for Stricter
Appellate Review of Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV.
527, 530 (2012) (“[W]hile the stakes are similar to class certification rulings and the standard
of review is ostensibly the same (abuse of discretion), appellate courts actually give much
more deference to district court decisions concerning [forum non conveniens].”).
219. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1326.
220. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13.
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it probably is not twice as expensive, since a litigant can re-use much of the
prior district court filings on appeal. When calculating the relative costs of
the courts, the cost to the litigant should also be considered along with the
cost to the judiciary. Thus, we need to take into account litigant costs from
the original and subsequent fora and the possibility that circuit costs differ
depending on the capacity in which the circuit court acts.
Beyond the question of cost is the question of time. All else being equal,
a speedier process is preferable to a lengthier one. The Supreme Court has
suggested that this is, or ought to be, a key motivator in the design of the
jurisdictional scheme: “The most obvious advantage of direct review by a
court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a district court,
followed by a second review on appeal.” 221 Similarly, Congress identified
speed as the main reason for the first direct review statute of the FTC. 222
But, again, this rationale kicks in only if an appeal is likely. If Congress has
guessed wrong as to which sorts of cases are likely to be appealed—and,
truth be told, it does not appear that Congress has made much of a guess at
all—then time-savings are not realized.
In fact, it is possible that routing the wrong cases to the circuit court for
direct review could translate to a longer process. 223 The circuit court could
take longer to decide the case, or, as the Supreme Court has observed,
there can be enormous delay if the circuit court has to remand an issue to
the agency to develop facts. 224 This question is ultimately an empirical one,
and it is a question that has thus far gone without much study. Statistics
compiled by the federal government shed light on the average duration of
all civil cases in both the district and circuit courts, suggesting that slightly
more time passes from filing to disposition in the district court than in the
circuit court. 225 But these differences might not hold true for suits
challenging agency actions, so the question remains: From the time of
221. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 88, at § 3943 (stating that direct circuit court review would likely be faster than
two-tiered review).
222. H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.).
223. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1336 (“Direct court of appeals review can even prolong
the litigation process. Absent a high appeal rate from district court decisions, direct review
lengthens the total review time unless the courts of appeals can decide petitions for review
more expeditiously than district courts can decide habeas applications, which is doubtful.”).
224. Harrison, 446 U.S. at 593–94.
225. Compare United States Courts, Table C-5 Time Intervals from Filing to Disposition of Civil
Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.
gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/
C05Mar12.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2015), with United States Courts, Table B-4 Median Time
Intervals in Cases Terminated after Hearing or Submission, by Circuit, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/B04Sep13.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 2, 2015).
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filing, would direct review cases last longer in the circuit court or in the
district court? We hesitate to offer a guess. Without an answer based on
data, however, the time-savings rationale is a shaky foundation on which to
build the case for direct review by circuit courts.
One final note is that even if efficiency favors direct circuit court review
in some subsets of cases, the current system does a poor job in identifying
cases with a strong appeal potential and those that lack it. In fact, Congress
seems to get it backwards with some frequency. Petitions to review
immigration cases, for example, inundate circuit courts, despite the relative
lack of care, and, often, merit, put into the challenges and the estimated low
chance of appeal if they were they placed in the district court in the first
instance. 226 Meanwhile, challenges to Department of Education and
DHHS regulations—strong candidates for appeals given the amount of
money and important issues of policy at stake—begin their judicial journey
at the district court. 227
2. Triage
Not only does district court review screen out a large number of cases
from the circuit courts, but it also allows circuit courts to spend less time on
cases that are ultimately appealed. 228 Although circuit courts are supposed
to engage in de novo review on appeals, they may be satisfied by the review
that has already happened and be somewhat more relaxed in their ultimate
review. A good example of this is the unpublished opinion: under the
current system, although appeals are technically available as of right, circuit
courts often resolve appeals through non-precedential, unpublished
opinions. 229 The premise behind these unpublished decisions is that circuit
judges cannot spend sufficient time or care on them to be confident in the
outcome. 230 Judges have referred to unpublished dispositions as “junk”
law 231 and “not safe for human consumption.” 232 By choosing which
226. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1326.
227. E.g., Ass’n of Private Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137–38
(D.D.C. 2012) (involving a Department of Education regulation); Belmont Abbey Coll. v.
Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2012) (involving a Department of Health and
Human Services regulation).
228. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 18.
229. Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 354–55
(2009).
230. Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, FED.
LAW., June 2004, at 36, 37–38; Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 791–94 (1981).
231. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 56 (2007).
232. Kozinski, supra note 230, at 37.
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appeals deserve the full, precedential treatment and which get a more
cursory review, circuit courts triage their resources to the issues where
precedential rulings are needed. 233
Thus, combining the certiorari-like aspect of appellate procedure with
initial district court review would provide for full circuit court treatment of
an issue only when (1) the parties view it as sufficiently important to appeal,
and (2) the circuit court decides to spend enough time on the case to write a
precedential opinion. Although circuit courts can write non-precedential
opinions even on direct review, they may be more willing to do so if one
Article III judge has already given the case a close look. Whether allowing
circuit courts to shirk their review is a good thing or a bad thing is a
complicated question. 234 From a pure cost perspective, though, the benefits
are palpable. If a chief concern in all this is unnecessary duplication, or
doubt that there “should be two tiers of review of identical scope of the
administrative decision,” 235 then a standard of appellate review that is not
quite de novo may actually make sense.
F. Accuracy
Although there is a long-running debate over what the ultimate goals of
a judicial system should be, accuracy, however defined, is regularly among
the top values. 236 Accuracy, however, would likely be improved by the
inclusion of district courts in the judicial process in administrative review
cases, as arguments are the better for having been screened by a district
judge and matured during an added tier of litigation. Only under very
narrow circumstances—high district court error, low circuit court error,
and low rates of appeal of those particular matters—would accuracy favor
direct circuit court review. As we explain, this alignment of variables is
likely very rare. Thus, rather than supporting direct circuit court review,
the accuracy argument favors administrative cases being placed on the
233. Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges
Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 433
(2013).
234. For criticism of circuit court publication practices, see Penelope Pether, Constitutional
Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; Or Why The Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential
Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 961–62 (2009)
(denouncing the nonprecedential status rules in regards to unpublished opinions); Pether,
supra note 231, at 20 (indicating that unpublished opinions are more likely to be wrong
because they are not usually written by judges).
235. Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998).
236. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475–91 (1986) (discussing the core values in our
judicial system); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 155 (1997) (“Truth and accuracy are vital values.”).
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same judicial path as every other case.
1. Unappealed Erroneous District Court Rulings
So far, we have largely credited the litigant’s appeal preferences as a key
determinant of the preferred court. However, to the extent that the
ultimate goal of a judicial system is to improve accuracy, relying on litigant
appeal preferences will often fall short. 237
A litigant’s wish for a circuit court ruling does not necessarily imply that
it is socially beneficial to grant it. 238 Nor is it necessarily fair or just to
assign a litigant to a lengthier and more costly appeal process because that
process will dissuade an appeal. 239 A litigant’s incentives are not necessarily
aligned with those of society, and, therefore, her appeal preferences should
not be treated as conclusive. 240 This difficulty is compounded by the fact
that litigants might not correctly identify which decisions are likely to be
reversed on appeal. 241
Giving undue weight to the likelihood of appeal can lead to a less
accurate system under the right conditions. 242 For example, consider a case
that is likely to be botched by the district court but likely to be fixed by the
court of appeals. If the litigants were to accept the error rather than to
appeal (whether they are deterred by high transaction costs or information
costs), then placing that dispute directly in the circuit court would lead to a
more accurate outcome, so long as the circuit court will reach the correct
outcome on direct review.
There are two problems with using this possibility as a basis for system
design. First, we think this scenario will be fairly rare. As we unpack
below, there is little empirical or theoretical reason to think that district
courts are erring at rates significantly higher than circuit courts. Moreover,
a priori, we would expect litigants to more readily appeal from erroneous
district court decisions where they believe they can obtain a reversal from
the circuit court, although efforts to model or study litigant appeal behavior
are so far inconclusive. 243
237. Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection,
and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 173, 194 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006).
238. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
379, 387 (1995).
239. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 18.
240. Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 237.
241. Id.
242. Shavell, supra note 238; Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 237.
243. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1457, 1512, 1514 (2003); Shavell, supra note 238, at 390; Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Appealing Judgments, 31 RAND J. ECON. 502, 503 (2000); Matt Spitzer & Eric
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Second, when designing a system ex ante, it will be difficult or impossible
to identify situations where district courts are getting it “wrong” and circuit
courts are getting it “right.” Even assuming that these concepts have any
coherence as a theoretical matter, there is unlikely to be a consensus on
measurement for quite some time. Simply looking at circuit court reversal
rates, for instance, would tell you that circuit and district courts are
reaching different outcomes, but it would not tell you whether it was the
district court that was erring or the circuit court. In fact, this is one of the
key criticisms of empirical legal scholarship: Because it is difficult to code
content, empiricists have placed inordinate weight on outcomes. 244
a. Comparative Personnel
Much of the pretext behind the case for direct circuit review is that the
judges who staff appellate courts are, on balance, smarter or otherwise
“better” at judging than their district court counterparts. 245 We are quite
doubtful of this proposition as an empirical matter, given the impressively
high quality of the federal judiciary as a whole. 246 If anything, the less
political nature of the district judge selection process could indicate that
merit plays a greater role in who is appointed to the bench, which in turn
would suggest higher quality district judges. 247
But apart from pure “smarts,” it may be that circuit judges, through
experience, form an expertise that makes them better suited to review
administrative actions. As the intermediate appellate courts, circuit judges
spend their days reviewing the work of others.248 In contrast, district judges
Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 650–51 (2000).
244. Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of
Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 885 (2008).
245. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 12 (emphasizing the capacity for superior
decisionmaking); Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Trial and Appellate Judges: How Do They Differ?, 36
W. POL. Q. 570, 570 (1983) (“Conventional wisdom suggests that the more prestigious U.S.
Courts of Appeals will be staffed by judges who are ‘better’ trained and more ‘qualified’ in
several respects than their counterparts on the U.S. District Courts.”).
246. Oldfather, supra note 229, at 330–31 (“At least in the federal courts, nothing about
the process by which judges are selected or the terms under which they serve suggests that
judges on appellate courts are inherently more competent than trial judges at resolving legal
issues.”).
247. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 11 (2013)
(concluding that ideology does not play as large a role at the district court level as in the
higher levels of the federal judiciary).
248. See Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 168, at 965 (“As such, review of these cases in
the courts of appeals is quite logical, because it is similar to what those courts usually do.”).
However, it is important to note that judicial review of administrative decision is more
deferential than appellate review of lower court decisions. Even similar standards, like
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are “more accustomed to exercising discretion, [and] less accustomed to
reviewing its exercise . . . .”249 However, the flip side of this is that district
judges are used to having their discretionary decisions reviewed by circuit
courts and, thus, may be more sensitive to deferential standards. Knowing
what it feels like to have a discretionary decision reversed, district judges
may be less likely to overstep their power of review. Further, through
assessing motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict, district
judges are accustomed to weighing evidence to determine whether it is
sufficient to support a jury verdict—the same standard called for by the
substantial evidence standard of APA review. 250 Non-dispositive orders of
magistrate judges are reviewed only for clear error. 251 Habeas petitions
also call for deferential review in the case of state court decisions. 252 On the
whole, then, a district judge reviewing an agency decision under a
deferential standard is hardly entering unfamiliar territory.
Another possibility is that circuit judges may have an opportunity to
develop specific expertise in the law or science applicable to the review of
particular agency decisions. 253 Because there are fewer circuit judges,
placing review of especially complicated agency decisions in a particular
circuit court allows those judges to learn, through repeated exposure to the
issues, more about highly technical nuances applicable to certain agencies.
“One of thirty district judges in a circuit can expect to hear no more than 3
percent of the total caseload in any field; one of nine appellate judges will
hear 33 percent of that caseload.” 254 For example, the judges on the D.C.
Circuit have, through repeated adjudication of numerous petitions for
review of FERC orders, learned a great deal about the complicated set of
regulations and background industry economics that are implicated in such

“abuse of discretion,” are subtly different when there is court/agency review instead of
court/court. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 159 (1999) (quoting Morgan v. Daniels,
153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894)) (reasoning that the greater deference to agencies is grounded in
notions of separation of powers, stating “‘[b]ut this is something more than a mere appeal. It is an
application to the court to set aside the action of one of the executive departments of the
government.”’).
249. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 13.
250. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 66 (1966) (requiring
substantial evidence); Dragich, supra note 152, at 60 (“Review for error under highly
deferential standards of review calls for careful study of the record and established law, a
task with which district judges are highly familiar.”).
251. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012).
252. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
253. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 98 (2011) (highlighting the need for understanding the role of
agencies).
254. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 13–14 (noting that the disparity persists but is
lessened if we control for the confounding factor of three-judge panels).
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cases. 255 Given the greater number of district judges in any particular
circuit, to say nothing of their tendency to work solitarily rather than
collegially, each district judge would be unlikely to hear numerous
challenges to FERC orders, even if Congress did give district courts
jurisdiction in the first instance. 256
Increased judicial experience with a particular statutory scheme or
regulatory framework could allow for a more informed review, but it also
comes with a serious downside: judges who know an area may be more
willing to second-guess the agency’s decision. 257 Critics have long opposed
a specialized administrative court, in part for this reason. 258 Regardless of
whether one thinks this increased experience is a good thing or a bad thing,
however, it is only effective if there are a limited number of decisions that
go to the circuit court. If circuit courts were to be inundated with
challenges to every type of agency decision, the court would either have to
be dramatically expanded, thereby reducing the likelihood that any
particular judge would have repeat interactions with an agency, or the
judges would be so overwhelmed with workload from a diverse set of cases
that they could develop expertise in nothing.259
So far, there is little basis for thinking that circuit judges are better at
reviewing agency decisions than district judges.

255. E.g., S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (involving
“challenges to the most recent reforms of electronic transmission planning and cost
allocation”).
256. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3940 (“Concentration of review in the courts of
appeals may facilitate the development of greater expertise in the substantive areas
administered by the agencies, since a far smaller number of appellate judges perform the
chores that otherwise would be performed by many district judges.”).
257. See Pierce, supra note 253, at 90–93 (summarizing research showing the D.C.
Circuit is less deferential than its counterparts and offering explanations). A further
advantage of judicial review being limited to a smaller set of judges is that it allows for
greater predictability. See Cross, supra note 41, at 1255–56 (discussing the lack of
predictability that flows from “the random assignment of cases to individual district judges
or three-judge appellate panels that may be unrepresentative of the judiciary as a whole”).
An agency that knows any challenge that will go before a randomly drawn sample of ten
D.C. Circuit judges has a much better idea of the judicial personalities likely to hear the
case. However, this advantage does not consistently distinguish direct review in a regional
circuit from district court review, given the large number of circuit courts in which a
challenge may be brought. If an agency can predict the forum because it is an agency
decision of limited impact, like an adjudication, it can respond to the likely set of jurists
drawn for the review, whether at the district or circuit level.
258. E.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 188 (discussing the fear of the court becoming the
expert).
259. FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 184–88.
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b. Institutional Competence
Circuit courts are generally credited with having four advantages over
district courts: (1) as appellate bodies, we expect that there will be a
narrowing of issues on appeal, at least if the advocates are skilled; (2)
litigants in the circuit court can focus on briefing without the distractions of
discovery; (3) the circuit court and the parties already have had the benefit
of one arbiter previously working through the legal issue; and (4) they
decide cases in sets of three. 260 Notably, the first three of these no longer
distinguish district courts from the circuit courts on direct review of agency
decisions. However, the benefits of collegial decisionmaking still apply.
Professors Currie and Goodman found this to be “by far the most
important” argument in favor of circuit court decisionmaking. 261
Collaborative decisionmaking is thought to improve the quality of
decisionmaking by invoking the collective judgment of three judges instead
of one and by providing a process for jurists to debate a complicated
issue. 262 The assumption that “three heads are better than one” enjoys
support by analogy to other contexts, though empirical application to
judicial decisionmaking is incomplete. 263 Yet this advantage is also likely
overstated, as it depends on the three judges engaging in meaningful
deliberation over the case. 264 In reality, panels often delegate primary
responsibility for a case to a single authoring judge, with the other two
members reading the opinion but giving the matter less than their full
attention. 265 Deliberation is not something that is easy to monitor, much
less to police. Nevertheless, in some particularly complicated cases, circuit
courts depart from the typical single-judge authorship approach and
distribute the workload among the members of the panel. 266
260. Mead, supra note 30, at 823; see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,
231–32 (1991).
261. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 12.
262. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme Courts, in PROCEDURAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 26–34 (Chris Sanchirico ed., 2012) (cataloging the theorized benefits of
collegiality); Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of
Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 43
(2009).
263. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 77 (David Klein & Gregory
Mitchell eds., 2010) (“Though numerous scholars have extended our collective knowledge
about the role of law in judicial choice, virtually none have paid attention to how the small
group context of collegial court decision making might matter for understanding the
influence of legal factors in appellate adjudication.”). One exception is empirical evidence
that collegial decisionmaking was more likely to find state statutes unconstitutional.
Solimine, supra note 149, at 129–30.
264. Oldfather, supra note 229, at 330.
265. Id.
266. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“The
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The implicit premise to this discussion is that deliberation is more likely
to lead to a correct decision. This is likely true when the various members
of a group bring expertise, experience, or perspective on which they can
draw to further the quest for truth. But looking for “correctness” may be a
fool’s errand if there is no meaningful standard to apply. If asked to pick
the “best” flavor of ice cream, 267 a panel of experts will fare no better than
a hungry child. It is possible, though, that the amorphous standards that
govern agency decisions—most notably arbitrary and capricious review—
are sufficiently without content that deliberation has no refining value. 268
We are sympathetic to this possibility, but are not yet ready to go quite that
far.
Beyond improving the quality of decisionmaking, collegial
decisionmaking also ensures that at least two judges must vote to set aside
agency action, thereby preventing a single rogue judge from throwing out
the considered decision of an agency. 269 In part, this is a numbers game.
Assume that judges are randomly assigned to a case, which is typical, and
that 10% of judges up for selection would issue unsupportable rulings,
which is hypothetical. If a single judge is the decider, there is a 10% chance
of an unsupportable ruling. But if a majority of a three-judge panel must
issue a ruling, two erring judges would have to be picked. Yet there is little
reason to think that such a rate of district court error is common,
particularly in light of the low rates of reversal that district courts enjoy. 270
Moreover, the would-be errant or sloppy judge is checked by the
omnipresent threat of appeal and reversal.
In sum, the practice of circuit courts using multiple judges to decide
matters might improve decisionmaking, although how much is difficult to
quantify, and whether it is worth this added cost is another question
altogether. 271 Thus, it is possible that circuit courts would be more likely
than district courts to get certain types of decisions “right.” We would
expect that circuit court advantage to be at its peak in particularly complex
opinion in this case is issued per curiam . . . because the complexity of the issues raised on
appeal made it useful to share the effort required to draft this opinion among the members
of the court.”).
267. The answer, of course, is pistachio chocolate.
268. As one article put it: “The rules governing judicial review have no more substance
at the core than a seedless grape . . . .” Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on
Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780–81 (1975).
269. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 998 (2002) (“[T]he development of
an appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the higher levels . . . operates structurally to
ensure that no individual judge can, by his or her actions alone, inflict too much damage on
the judiciary by making aberrant or overly ambitious decisions.”).
270. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28–29 (1994).
271. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 9.
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cases where the judges engage in meaningful back and forth, and each
judge brings some measure of relevant experience or knowledge to the
discussion. The advantage ebbs for straightforward cases and fact-intensive
cases, such as reviewing a fact-based adjudication about an individual’s
entitlement to benefits or other relief. Interestingly, however, the United
States Code today often channels review of simple adjudications, such as
deportation orders or airline mechanic licensure, to the court of appeals,
even though collaboration is unlikely to be of use in these types of
decisions. 272
Finally, note that an argument for collaborative decisionmaking is simply
an argument for three-judge panels at whichever court happens to hear a
case; it is agnostic as to the level of those three judges. As noted above,
district courts were previously directed to resolve challenges to certain
agency decisions in three-judge panels. 273 The benefits that may come with
collaborative decisionmaking do not, by their own force, compel review in
any particular court. 274 Today, however, we are accustomed to triplets at
the circuit court and singles at the district court.
c. Ideology
The advantage that collegiality gives to circuit courts must be balanced
not only against its cost, but also against the potential ideological influences
on circuit court decisionmaking. If empirical evidence implies that circuit
courts are more ideological than district courts when reviewing agency
action, and if we believe that ideological influences are improper and,
therefore, lead to “wrong” decisions, then the benefits of collegiality could
be quickly overwhelmed by improper influences. If a circuit court employs
ideology when reviewing a non-ideological district court decision, then it
will have introduced an error where none previously existed.
The empirical literature in this area is increasingly deep and
sophisticated but still incomplete. Empiricists have repeatedly, though not
universally, found evidence of ideological correlations in the voting
behavior of federal judges at the Supreme Court and circuit court levels, 275
272. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2012); 49 U.S.C. § 46110.
273. Supra Part I.B.1.
274. It is possible that it would be more disruptive, or awkward, for district judges
accustomed to solitary rule over a limited fiefdom to decide cases in groups of three than it
would be for circuit judges to undertake the same process. After all, each circuit court meets
collegially several times a year, while district judges might go years in between sittings. The
legislative history to the Administrative Orders Review Act reveals currents of the belief that
three-judge district court panels were just too clumsy. Hearings, supra note 83, at 112. Yet
some of the complaints that applied in the 1940s, such as the inconvenience of sharing drafts
by postal mail, have lesser relevance in the modern era.
275. Pierce, supra note 253, at 77 & n.1; Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology
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frequently in the context of review of administrative decisions.276 For
example, scholars have found an ideological correlation in voting behavior
at the D.C. Circuit in EPA cases, 277 review of agency health and safety
decisions, 278 application of Chevron deference, 279 and arbitrary and
capricious review. 280
Yet it is important not to overstate the strength of the ideological
correlation. 281 Even the strongest evidence of ideology’s role finds a
relationship only in a minority of decisions. 282 Authors are quick to observe
that legal factors, such as precedent and the arguments of the parties, play a
large—likely the largest—role in predicting case outcomes. 283 Further, the
methodologies in the empirical literature have been the subject of fierce
criticism. Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit noted that the studies omitted
variables, including applicable precedent and the record before the court,
which might also explain the voting patterns. 284 Professors Epstein and
King identified a number of methodological flaws that they believe
undermine legal empirical work in general.285 Their conclusion was harsh:
legal empirical scholars have been “proceeding with little awareness of,
much less compliance with, many of the rules of inference, and without
paying heed to the key lessons of the revolution in empirical analysis that
has been taking place over the last century in other disciplines.” 286 Other
scholars reminded the legal academy that, even if a correlation is
in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999).
276. See generally Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1111 (2002) (discussing the use of empirical evidence in administrative rulemaking).
277. E.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1717 (1997).
278. E.g., Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001).
279. E.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Makes Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006).
280. E.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008).
281. David E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions,
Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813 (2010).
282. Pinello, supra note 275; Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public
and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 NW. L. REV. 743, 758 (2005).
283. Cross, supra note 243, at 1515.
284. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1914–15 (2009);
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1336 (1998); Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985).
285. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
286. Id. at 1.
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established, correlation does not necessarily imply causation. 287
The evidence of ideology in district court decisions is considerably
weaker and more mixed. This may suggest that ideology plays a lesser role
in the decisions of district judges, or it may simply be a reflection of the
relative dearth of empirical scholarship focusing on these courts.
There are some important theoretical reasons to believe that ideology is
a lesser problem in the district courts. These include (1) the more
contentious or “difficult” nature of cases handled by the circuit courts;288 (2)
the less visible, and thus less politically charged, confirmation process; (3)
the use of merit-based instruments in the selection of district judges; 289 and
(4) the stronger check on ideological decisionmaking secured through
appeal as of right in the circuit courts (compared with certiorari in the
Supreme Court). 290
On the other hand, the autonomy enjoyed by district judges removes a
major check on ideological decisionmaking. Whereas a circuit judge has to
convince at least one other colleague that her position is sound, a district
judge has to convince nobody but herself. All else being equal, this
structural factor would presumably serve as an obstacle to ideological
decisionmaking: a position that is based in part on one’s politics or
worldview is less likely to withstand collegial scrutiny than one based on
legally cognizable variables, like facts, law, precedent, etc. At the very least,
287. Ho & Quinn, supra note 281, at 817. Another point to consider is the distinction
between ideological inclinations, or the desire that a judge may have to render a decision
that comports with her policy preferences, and ideological decisionmaking, or the extent to
which that desire is in fact actualized in a decision. Some disputes may trigger a judge’s
ideological inclinations, for example, claims under the Bill of Rights, but nevertheless
present little opportunity for the judge to express those inclinations due to the force of clear
precedent. Other disputes may be less likely to trigger strong ideological reactions but
nevertheless yield more ideological decisionmaking because the body of law is relatively
malleable. An example of this later phenomenon may be disputes under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Although the standard of review is generally thought to
be rather deferential, so that we would expect few reversals of agency decisions, empirical
study has shown that judicial review under NEPA corresponds significantly with the political
affiliation of the deciding judge. See JAY E. AUSTIN ET AL., JUDGING NEPA: A “HARD
LOOK” AT JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT 7–9 (2004); Nicholas A. Fromherz, From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval as a
Prerequisite to Environmentally Significant Projects, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 123 (2013).
288. In fact, as cases move up the judicial food chain, they are supposed to get more
difficult. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 247, at 234–35.
289. See Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 137, 140
(1995) (discussing the merit-based selection panels for district judges).
290. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 247, at 226 (“A district judge’s own
ideology can be expected to influence some of his decisions, though probably only a small
percentage because of the prospect of reversal if he deviates from the precedents established
by and the known ideological propensities of the judges of the court of appeals for his
circuit.”).

50

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[67:1

a district judge who wished to inject ideology into his decisions would seem
to have an easier go of it, even if the effect was only temporary, given the
possibility of reversal on appeal. Of course, this hardly means that a
significant number of district judges leverage this structural opportunity.
Unfortunately, despite the theorizing, there has been far less empirical
work on the role of ideology in the district courts. Although the literature
suggests that ideology may have a slightly diminished role in the district
courts, far more study is needed to confirm this observation. 291 One study
found a difference of 10% to 13% between Democratic and Republican
district judges for all types of cases, civil, criminal, and administrative. 292
On the other hand, this same study found a stronger correlation in the
circuit courts. 293 Similarly, in the context of religious freedom decisions,
Professors Heise and Sisk found that politically conservative judges,
whether hailing from the district courts or the circuit courts, were less likely
than their liberal counterparts to credit free-exercise or accommodation
claims. 294 Again, though, the correlation was stronger with respect to
circuit judges. 295
Though we must again stress scholars’ relative neglect of district courts,
the balance of studies does suggest that ideology is more consistently
imbedded in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts. 296 This was echoed
in the recent studies conducted by Richard Posner, William Landes, and
Lee Epstein, who found that Republican circuit judges were more likely to
issue conservative decisions than Republican district judges. 297 This
resonates with the conventional wisdom that circuit courts, and certainly
the Supreme Court, are more like political institutions than the district
courts.
291. It could be argued that the average issue presented to district courts is less
controversial than those that make it up to the circuit court because litigants first persevere
through two tiers of litigation to get a circuit opinion in their case. Thus, the fact that circuit
courts display a higher correlation with ideological variables simply reflects the less settled,
and, therefore, more controversial, nature of the controversies at that level.
292. C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 34 (1996).
293. ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 7 (1983) (“[T]he evidence for a relationship between judicial
background variables and subsequent policy decisions is somewhat inconclusive. Although it
is fairly strong for appellate court judges, it is weak and inconsistent for trial jurists.”).
294. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of
Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1216–17 (2012).
295. Id. at 1217.
296. Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV.
469, 486–87 (1998) (collecting studies); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 273–74 (1995). But see
Sisk & Heise, supra note 294.
297. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 247, at 234.

2015]

CHOOSING A COURT TO REVIEW THE EXECUTIVE

51

Once more, the balance between the benefits of collegiality and the
influence of ideology is an empirical question. Yet assuming that ideology
is present among circuit courts in certain classes of cases, we might want to
limit circuit court involvement in those cases. Thus, politically charged
agency decisions under the Clean Air Act or the National Labor Relations
Act could tend to implicate judicial political preferences. Contrary to the
existing scheme, that would, if true, militate in favor of placement in a
relatively non-ideological forum. District courts just might fit the bill. Of
course, to the extent these matters represent issues of national policy with
likely appeals, such additional factors would cut the other way.
d. Forum Shopping
Related to the issue of ideology is the question of forum shopping. The
orthodox thinking on forum shopping goes like this: The practice of a
litigant choosing a particular court or jurist for a strategic reason—such
that Court X will tend to favor the litigant’s position over Court Y 298—
represents a flaw in the judicial system. 299 Not only is such a practice
unseemly, but forum shopping has practical problems as well. If an agency
expects a challenge to a decision but does not know in which forum the
challenge will be brought, the agency will not know which judges it will
have to satisfy, nor even which circuit’s law will govern the challenge. 300
Although not without dissent, “forum shopping” is a dirty term among
scholars and judges. 301 At some level, opportunities for forum shopping
may be a necessary evil, but we assume for purposes of this Article that a
system that limits opportunities to forum shop is generally preferable to a
system that promotes such opportunities.
Opportunities for forum shopping only arise when plaintiffs have more

298. As Chris Whytock points out, forum shopping assumes not just multiple forums, but
at least some degree of heterogeneity. Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 486 (2011). Without heterogeneity, a plaintiff would have
no reason to choose one forum over another.
299. The stakes of forum shopping take on even greater dimensions in the context of
transnational litigation, where the choice of forums implicates not just a choice between two
or more courts, but a choice between two or more countries, and often, two or more entirely
different legal systems. See id. at 485 (“Domestic forum shopping occurs when a plaintiff
chooses between two or more courts within a single country’s legal system, whereas
transnational forum shopping occurs when the choice is between the courts of two or more
countries’ legal systems.”).
300. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 514 (2002).
301. For a brief summary of the benefits of forum shopping, see Thomas O. McGarity,
Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302,
318–19 (1980).
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than one forum in which they can plausibly file suit. 302 And concerns over
forum shopping tend to become more pronounced as the number of
available forums increases. In other words, a scenario that presents only
two potential forums is less problematic than a scenario giving rise to a
dozen.
With this in mind, a uniform system of initial review in district courts
might, at first glance, seem to invite more forum shopping. Especially in
states with multiple districts (the majority), litigants could be afforded a
choice of forum more frequently than if the statute called for direct review
in the circuit court. The loose character of venue statutes at the district
court level undoubtedly provides plaintiffs with latitude in filing and, thus,
opportunities to shop around. 303 On the other hand, even when it is clear
that initial review lies with the circuit court, forum shopping is not
necessarily precluded. Again, the APA does not identify a particular forum,
and the venue provisions of individual agency statutes commonly allow for
review in several possible circuits. 304
This is the problem of what we might call “horizontal forum shopping.”
But the split scheme also allows for vertical forum shopping: the ability of
the litigant to pick the level of the court, circuit or district. For example, a
challenge based on an agency action might go directly to the circuit court,
so a clever litigant could recast the challenge as an agency’s failure to act to
force the issue to the district court. Or a litigant might choose to name
particular agencies as defendants to force a case to a particular forum. 305
For many cases, there will be only one correct forum. In these cases, we do
not have a situation of concurrent jurisdiction—where two courts have
legal authority to hear the suit—but nevertheless we have ambiguity as to
which court has jurisdiction, allowing the challenging party to exploit the
ambiguity to obtain a favored court. 306 If a plaintiff can make a plausible
argument of original jurisdiction in both the district court and circuit court,
she has an opportunity to choose a forum based on strategic considerations
where both courts’ interpretation of the law of jurisdiction would seem to
indicate otherwise. For other cases, however, a challenging party can pick
a preferred forum through thoughtful casting of the challenge—an option
that is made possible only through the divided scheme of review.
302. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV.
553, 554 (1989) (“[F]orum shopping connotes the exercise of the plaintiff’s option to bring a
lawsuit in one of several different courts.”).
303. McGarity, supra note 301, at 304 n.3.
304. McGarity, supra note 301, at 304.
305. See Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
306. Suburban Mortg. Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d
1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lamenting the forum shopping generated by an ambiguous
ruling dividing jurisdiction between the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts).
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Although usually thought of from the perspective of a plaintiff, the
current scheme also permits the agency some leeway in choosing a forum by
modifying the type of decisionmaking process it will undertake. For
example, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that SEC has increasingly
opted for administrative adjudications, which can be appealed directly to
the court of appeals, instead of bringing suit in federal district court. 307
EPA avoids the Clean Air Act’s channeling of challenges to promulgated air
quality standards to the D.C. Circuit 308 by imposing its standards through
decisions on individual plans. 309 Jurisdictional divisions can be gamed by
the agency as well as the challenger.
2. The Added Value of District Court Review
The argument for accuracy has so far considered the cases that are not
appealed. But what about the cases that end up in the circuit court
anyway? In the prior section, we noted that a pure cost approach might
favor direct review of these decisions. Yet the question is not simply the
expense of a particular jurisdictional scheme but its value: what you get for
what you spend. As put by Justice Berger: “Efficiency must never be the
primary objective of a free people.” 310 Applying this rubric, the question of
jurisdiction requires weighing the costs of an erroneous decision versus the
cost of getting the right outcome. 311 Far from being worthless, as the
Supreme Court has implied, district courts improve the overall accuracy of
the judicial system by offering useful opinions, providing a chance for
litigants to narrow and improve their arguments, and potentially tempering
ideology. Moreover, for the fraction of cases that require resolution of
factual disputes—notably facts relevant to standing, but also potentially
issues about the scope of the record, or facts relevant to a constitutional
case—district courts provide a decisive advantage.
First, having one Article III judge work through the agency’s decision
and record provides helpful guidance to the reviewing circuit court. True,
having a lower court opinion will not be as helpful in administrative review
cases as it is in other cases, since the courts already have the benefit of a
formal decision from the agency. 312 But the added set of judicial eyes
looking at an agency’s lengthy decision—with an administrative record
307. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21,
2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413
849590.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012).
309. See Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2012).
310. Leventhal, supra note 197, at 435.
311. See Shavell, supra note 238, at 387.
312. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 17.
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perhaps spanning thousands of pages—and applying the APA standard
almost certainly provides some assistance to the appellate court. Although
this could backfire in some situations—such as if the panel used a faulty
district court opinion as a roadmap for the analysis on appeal or as a
summary of the administrative record—that seems unlikely to occur with
any frequency.
Moreover, the added layer provides a further opportunity to crystallize
issues on appeal by reducing the volume and improving the quality of
arguments. By briefing the matter in the district court, the litigant will be
forced to show her cards and, perhaps more importantly, see the
opponent’s hand. Rational litigants will abandon the arguments on which
they are clearly outmatched, while fine-tuning potential winners in
subsequent rounds of briefing before the circuit court. The well-established
rule of issue-forfeiture, if consistently applied, prevents litigants from raising
new arguments on appeal. 313
The benefits of an added layer of review are highlighted by the common
practice of district courts referring all challenges to Social Security
Administration benefit determinations to magistrate judges for report and
recommendation. 314 By providing another judge’s analysis and giving
litigants an opportunity to focus their challenge, this added layer of review
is widely thought to be a helpful process rather than a wasteful one.
In addition to issue clarification, it is plausible that channeling agency
review cases through the district court would temper the ideological nature
of judicial review. As we discuss above, a common finding by empiricists is
that judicial ideology plays a role in a significant number of cases, at least at
the circuit court level. But, as noted above, there are empirical and
theoretical reasons to believe that district court decisionmaking tends to be
less ideological. 315 There are also reasons to believe that the influence of
district judges’ opinions persists to the appellate level, such that the district
judges serve as “hidden fourth members of the appellate panel[s].” 316 We
would expect, therefore, that routing a case through the less ideological
district court decisionmaking process would lead to a less ideological
decision on appeal. Of course, empirical study is needed to confirm this. 317
313. Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
314. E.g., Admin. Order 07-AO-015 (E.D. Mich. 2007), available at https://www.mied.
uscourts.gov/PDFFIles/07-AO-015.pdf.
315. See supra notes 289–297 and accompanying text.
316. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1165 (2010).
317. An attempt to test this hypothesis was made by Frank Cross. Cross found that in
situations where a circuit court affirms a district court, a circuit panel whose ideology is
unaligned with that of the district court will tend to issue a longer opinion than a panel
whose ideology is a match. Cross inferred that “longer opinions in this circumstance are
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In the previous section, we observed that initial district court review
could work as a timesaver by allowing circuit courts to engage in less
thorough review on the eventual appeal. The marginal gains of multi-layer
review would be quickly washed away if circuit courts engage in
commensurately less thorough review. Even with unpublished opinions,
however, the initial district court review is likely to improve circuit court
accuracy because circuit courts are quite unlikely to give the quick
treatment to every appeal from district courts. Instead, circuit courts likely
distinguish between “hard” and “easy” cases, giving the former a more
thorough work-up than the latter. District court review can help the circuit
courts distinguish between the two types of cases, 318 and for either type,
district court review serves as an advantage. For the hard cases that are
given a close look by the circuit court, the arguments presented to the
circuit court should be the better for having aged in the district court. And
for the easy cases, the circuit court can rest largely on the district court
decision, freeing up resources for the hard cases.
Further, as noted above, district courts have expertise when it comes to
factual development and resolution of factual disputes. 319 For the minority
of APA cases that involve factual disputes—whether regarding litigant
standing, constitutional issues, requests for preliminary relief, or debate
about the scope of the record—district courts serve as a logical choice to
hammer out these disputes.
Given the benefits of added judicial brainpower, increased issue
crystallization, potential tempering of ideological decisionmaking, and the
resolution of factual disputes when appropriate, there is reason to think that
district courts add value in administrative review cases, even when an
eventual appeal is likely. Quantifying the added value is no easy task, but
we might theorize that it is at its peak in cases that are complicated or bear
lengthy administrative records, cases with a strong threat of ideological
judging, and cases where standing or constitutional issues are likely to be at
play.
G. Summary
The arguments in favor of direct circuit court review depend on highly
meant to limit the scope of the holding and its precedential effect because the outcome
apparently does not align with judicial ideological preferences.” FRANK B. CROSS,
DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 66 (2007).
318. Again, it is possible that this could backfire in certain situations—a panel might
falsely assume a case is simple based on an erroneously stripped-down analysis by the district
court—but the sophistication of courts and litigants suggests that this would not happen very
often.
319. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text.

56

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[67:1

questionable premises. Even if the seemliness argument had some merit,
which it does not, it requires only that a circuit court be available at some
stage in the process, not on direct review. At best, the other arguments
provide tentative support for direct circuit court review only in very limited
circumstances, while favoring initial district court review most of the time.
The conditions under which one arrangement is favorable to the other can
be charted out as follows:
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Figure 2: Conditions Favorable to Competing Jurisdictional Schemes
Direct
Circuit District
Court Review
Review

Court

Workload
If circuit courts are
underworked, district
courts are overworked, and
reallocating or adding
judges is not a viable
strategy

If circuit courts are
relatively overworked
and litigants are deterred
from appeal

If district court rules are
not amended or
implemented consistent
with APA

If factual disputes will be
involved

If multiple challenges to
single action and if circuit
court ruling resolves
most/all challenges

If venue is concentrated
in single district court or
multiple challenges are
consolidated

If appeal rates are high and
triage is not preferred
strategy

If appeal rates are low
OR if appellate court
undertakes less fulsome
review based on work of
district court

If district court error is
high, circuit court error is
low, and appeal rates are
low

If circuit court error is
high and district court
error is low OR if district
courts improve circuit
court decisionmaking by
crystalizing and
narrowing issues and
tempering ideology and
if litigants tend to appeal
erroneous decisions

Rules

Authoritativeness

Efficiency

Accuracy
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The best arguments for direct circuit review—cost and time savings and
increased accuracy—are limited in their traction and must be balanced
against the benefits of an added layer of review and the ability of circuit
courts to spend resources where most needed. For the cases that would not
be appealed—most cases fall into this category—district courts are a clear
bargain, providing high quality decisionmaking at a low price. Unless we
have reason to think they are making systematic errors that circuit courts
would avoid, district courts are the logical choice.
Even if a matter is likely to be appealed, the case for direct circuit court
review is still highly tentative. Because initial district court review adds
some value to the decisionmaking process by resolving any factual disputes,
improving argument quality, and tempering ideology, it is useful in difficult
cases. And because initial district court review facilitates the circuit court
engaging in a more selective review, it is useful in easy cases where full
circuit court involvement is unneeded. This means that district courts add
value in both easy and hard cases, further weakening the argument for
direct circuit court review.
III. THE NEED FOR UNIFORM RULES
A. Uniform Rules
As noted above, the calculus as to the “best” forum and hierarchy might
differ from case to case depending on a number of specific circumstances.
But attempting to tailor jurisdictional rules to classes of cases comes with
two types of costs: the costs associated with making the initial choices and
the costs of implementing those choices. 320 First, there is the upfront cost of
determining where the division of jurisdiction should lie. 321 The marginal
benefits of tailored jurisdiction depend on this division being made
correctly. If you guess wrong, and assign cases to the wrong jurisdictional
treatment, you could be worse off than if you had stuck with a single rule.
Calculating the best division depends on weighing competing factors and
making important predictions about the future. This cost is significant; in
fact, as we have argued, Congress has not done a good job of allocating
jurisdiction based on any policy preference that we can identify.
Even the best predictions can turn stale over time. Agencies evolve
320. Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 523–24 (2012); Harold Leventhal, Book Review of Henry J.
Friendly’s Federal Jurisdiction: A General View, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1975) (describing
how federal courts should be limited to appellate review and factfinding); Scott Dodson &
Elizabeth McCuskey, Structuring Jurisdictional Rules and Standards, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
31, 35 (2012).
321. Nash, supra note 320, at 522.
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through time, changing their regulatory focus and their means of
implementing policy. For example, over time, many agencies have become
more reliant on rulemaking than individualized orders, perhaps departing
from the expectations of the Congresses that provided for direct review only
of “orders” and not “rules.” 322 Moreover, the scope of an agency’s
regulatory agenda can shift markedly due to changes in facts or the
political/legal landscape. The attacks of September 11, 2001 led to a
major shift in the missions and methodologies of several agencies. Once
attracting only the interest of specialists, DHHS has become increasingly
salient as debates over health care issues have rose to national prominence.
But statutes do not automatically adapt to temporal changes, and the utility
gains of today’s jurisdictional divide are rendered obsolete by the march of
time. Thus, the costs of designing the jurisdictional scheme do not end with
implementation; it will also require very costly monitoring if maximum
utility is to be achieved.
The more damning problem with the effort to tailor jurisdiction is not
the cost of design but of implementation. Today, there is frequent
indeterminacy in the appropriate forum for reviewing an agency’s action.
Repeated Supreme Court involvement and diverging conclusions from
sister circuits drive up the cost of litigating agency decisions. The
occasional and inconsistent interpretive methods employed by the courts
exacerbate the existing statutory ambiguities and introduce new ones. The
ambiguity as to proper forum leads to substantial dead weight in terms of
litigating disputes over jurisdiction and, perhaps even worse, missed
opportunities based on jurisdictional uncertainty. 323 It also can lead to
potentially duplicative proceedings required when one aspect of a challenge
is channeled to one forum and another aspect to another. 324 These costs
can quickly drown out any efficiency gains that might otherwise accrue.
The best approach would be to have a single, uniform system.325 One
easy fix would be to place all review in a single type of forum for all
categories of agency action. This would certainly reduce the amount of
jurisdictional litigation. Indeed, the strong trend over the last one hundred
years in other areas is to move toward the approach of placing all cases on
322. Note, supra note 7, at 989–92.
323. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting potential for forfeited claims); cf.
Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 168, at 1011 (noting the “inefficiency, uncertainty, and
inaccuracy generated by standing doctrine also impose large costs on both parties and courts
in cases where standing is ultimately found”).
324. Courts strive to interpret statutes to avoid bifurcated review, which reduces but
does not eliminate the potential for simultaneous proceedings. E.g., Wagner v. FEC, 717
F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2013); JAFFE, supra note 137, at 158.
325. McAllister, supra note 80, at 167 (“If we are to continue to have some form of
judicial review of administrative action the road to review should be as simple as possible.”).
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the same judicial path. 326 Thus, for instance, constitutional challenges to
state laws no longer require a three-judge tribunal, 327 and Supreme Court
certiorari jurisdiction has become nearly universal. Yet jurisdiction to
review administrative review cases has stubbornly bucked this trend by
getting more complicated.
We recognize that it may be a bit much, particularly in today’s deeply
cynical political environment, to expect Congress to go back and clean up
the mess it has created over the past century through a large-scale
recodification. 328 However, as Congress enacts new legislation, creating
new agencies, new programs, or new review schemes, it should strive to do
a better job going forward than it has to date.
B. Other Dividing Lines
Although we favor a single scheme, a next best alternative would be to
have a small number of clear rules dividing cases between the usual route of
district court review and direct circuit court review. The goal here is to
define a dividing line that is relatively free from ambiguity, that is resistant
to litigant manipulation through forum shopping, and that tends to place
cases on the track that maximizes the benefits we lay out in this Article.
Perhaps the most intuitive division would be between regulations and
individualized orders. 329 Regulations, having a broader impact, are more
326. Solimine, supra note 149, at 129–30 (discussing the use of three-judge district court
panels in the Civil Rights Era).
327. Id.
328. A reallocation of jurisdiction would have short-term implications for workload. For
example, a universal rule that gives district courts jurisdiction over all administrative cases
would add eight thousand cases a year to the district court docket. Given that circuit courts
are generally thought to be overworked, Congress might choose to hold the number of
circuit court judgeships constant and simply add judgeships to the district courts. But it
might have other options as well. Assuming that salary remained unchanged, Congress
might be able to redesignate circuit judges as district judges. This is an unsettled and
controversial topic beyond the scope of this Article. See generally David R. Stras & Ryan W.
Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007). Even if
constitutional, redesignating existing personnel would raise fears by each political party of
the other gaining an advantage through strategic designations. A better approach would be
to add judgeships to the district court, and allow circuit court judgeships to expire as they
become vacant until the workload reaches the level deemed ideal by Congress.
While there would be an upfront cost to correct the workload imbalance, likely by
adding district judgeships or prioritizing currently unfilled slots, the long term savings in
transaction costs, not to mention likely gains in efficiency and accuracy, are well worth this
fairly minor cost.
329. Although definitely preferable to the current system in terms of clarity, the dividing
line between rules and orders still suffers from ambiguity at the margins. Take a litigant who
appeals from an agency’s adjudication of his case but in that process seeks to draw into
question the agency’s regulation. Or what about an agency that acts through precedent-
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likely to be challenged by multiple parties, and, therefore, benefit from the
comparative authoritativeness of circuit court resolution of the legality of
the agency decision. Relatedly, we might expect that challenges to
regulations are more likely to be appealed to circuit courts than
individualized adjudications, given the rule’s broader impact, which could
justify direct circuit review on an efficiency rationale. Moreover, one might
hypothesize (although further testing would be needed to confirm) that
challenges to regulations tend to focus on legal questions—whether the rule
satisfies Chevron, for instance, or the Constitution—than adjudications,
which tend to involve fact-bound inquiries into whether the decision was
arbitrary or capricious or supported by substantial evidence.
Even for rules, however, the balance does not wholly favor direct circuit
review. Challenges to regulations are more likely to have fact-bound
ripeness or standing issues at play, which can be readily resolved by the
district court’s fact-finding machinery. Moreover, the abstract legal nature
of many challenges to regulations potentially invites ideological
decisionmaking, which should be mitigated to the extent possible. Finally,
the complexity and importance of nationwide regulation favors additional
deliberation, which favors allowing disputes to marinate a bit in district
court before locking in a rule at the circuit court. As with every category of
case that we have imagined so far, the rationales do not universally point to
one court over another.
CONCLUSION
Our primary goal here was to suggest a framework for analyzing future
decisions about jurisdiction, relying on data-driven goals of accuracy and
efficiency. Our secondary goal was to urge fewer, clearer rules. Applying
the framework, we find that the case for direct circuit court review has not
been made, and a single system of judicial review that begins in the district
court would be a better approach. Going forward, Congress should pay
more attention to the difficulties of a divided system of review and consider
more closely how it allocates review of agency decisions. Better yet,
Congress should revisit its prior choices and bring some order to the chaos
by adopting uniform legislation with simple rules.
Beyond major policy implications, we offer several specific lessons for
courts and litigants who must struggle with the existing system. For the
judiciary, we urge the adoption of predictable interpretive approaches.
Jurists’ occasional and inconsistent reliance on their own policy perspectives
setting, broad actions that are not regulations, such as Clean Air Act State Implementation
Plans? As highlighted by the cases discussed in Part I.B.3, courts have not found the
rule/order division to be clear so far, and there is little reason to think that such a system
would eliminate ambiguity.
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only makes matters worse for litigants by grafting ambiguity onto
ambiguity.
Moreover, when a litigant chooses the wrong forum, courts should
recognize the difficulty of the jurisdictional maze and exercise their
discretion to transfer a case to the right court, at least absent evidence of
bad faith or dilatory motive. 330 And when a litigant prudently files a
challenge in multiple courts, the courts can avoid wasting time by staying
one of the cases and resolving jurisdiction as the first priority.
We also identify a need for greater attention to the manner in which
district courts apply procedural rules to APA cases. A substantial fraction
of the district court docket is spent on APA cases, yet the civil rules that
apply to all proceedings in district court are quite awkward in these cases.
Although many district courts or judges have come up with ways to
implement the Civil Rules so as to better match the peculiarities of APA
cases, the process is ad hoc and unpredictable. It is well past time that we
amend the Civil Rules to reflect the idiosyncrasies of record-review matters.
Finally, we identify a number of unanswered empirical questions that
reflect a great level of uncertainty about how judicial review of agency
action is carried out in the real world. We plan to address some of these
questions in future empirical work.
The overall message is clear: The burden is on proponents of direct
circuit court review to make their case. And for supporters of the current
approach—ad hoc slicing and dicing from statute to statute and agency to
agency—that burden looks to be insurmountable.

330. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).

